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Abstract
We introduce a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness
Model (PCM), which is based on the hypothesis that the spatial eld of consciousness (FoC) is
structured by a projective geometry and under the control of a process of active inference. The
FoC in the PCM combines multisensory evidence with prior beliefs in memory, for the choices of
projective points of view, that respond to a combination of spatial and aective priors. Free energy
minimization drives intentionality, perspective taking and the switch between perception,
imagination and action in the FoC. Changes of projective frames govern how expectations are
transformed by consciousness. Our model suggests that changes of brain states from unconscious
to conscious reects the action of projective transformations. In the PCM, consciousness functions
as an algorithm for the maximization of resilience, using projective perspective taking and
imagination in order to escape local minima of free energy. The PCM can explain a variety of
psychological phenomena: the manifestation of subjective experience with its characteristic spatial
phenomenology, the distinctions and integral relationships between perception, imagination, and
action, the role of aective processes in intentionality, but also perceptual phenomena such as the
dynamics of bistable gures and body swap illusions in virtual reality. It relates phenomenology to
function, showing its computational and adaptive advantages. It suggests specic
neurophenomenological hypotheses about the brain, guidelines for designing articial systems, and
formal principles for psychology.
1 Introduction
1.1 Basic rationale and contextualization
We introduce a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness
Model (PCM), that identies core aspects of the phenomenology of consciousness with specic
computational mechanisms. The model integrates active inference and projective geometry to
dene a Field of Consciousness (Foc). The FoC operates as a mechanism of arbitration based on
the anticipation of the consequences of action. Its architecture embeds mechanisms of cognitive
and aective appraisal and reappraisal that exploit both local perceptual inference and non-local
projective imagination in order to orient attention and motivate action. The overall algorithm
yields a model that optimizes resilience to stressors and adverse conditions. The optimization of
resilience has been hypothesized to be a core function for embodied consciousness [1]. The PCM
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explains a broad range of perceptual, cognitive, and aective phenomena and leads to
straightforward neurocomputational hypotheses with a broad application potential.
The PCM is based on an interdisciplinary synthesis at the crossroads of multiple traditions and
concepts: Phenomenology [2{5], Francisco Varela's neurophenomenology program and reection on
embodiment and autonomy [6{9], Karl Friston's theory of active inference based on free energy
minimization as a model of embodied autonomous agents [10], Alain Berthoz's emphasis on the
sense of space as a multisensory, supramodal phenomenon [11]; projective geometry, from the
geometry of art and architecture during the Renaissance period to the theory of abstract cameras
and the latest advances in computer graphics [12,13], virtual reality, as it brings new insights
about self-consciousness [14], but also past and current models of consciousness [15,15{25],
neuropsychology, computational neuroscience [1, 26,27] and the aective sciences [28{31].
Our aim is not to try to solve the so-called hard problem [32], but to focus on the structural
phenomenology of experience and its representation in an overall computational framework capable
of explaining complex behaviors, decision-making and action, based on internal parameters. We
aim at establishing based on general mathematical and computational principles, how we, as
conscious, embodied systems, perceive, imagine, and act in the 3-dimensional spatial world, from a
rst person perspective, through a structural coupling with our environment, in order to cope with
physical and social situations and maintain our autonomy by optimizing resilience [1, 6, 8, 10].
Along with other models, we conceive of the core of consciousness as an integrative global
workspace [15,15,16,33], selected through evolution for adaptive representation and control in an
embodied context. We assume that consciousness participates in the orientation and directedness
of cognition and action towards concrete and abstract objects in accordance with preferences; this
can be expressed by the claim that consciousness is structured by an "intentional function" or
intentionality [34]. More generally, conscious agents have to solve the problem of covertly or overtly
(by explicit bodily actions) bringing into focus various parts of their surroundings for information
integration via sensory evidence and simulation in order to navigate the world. Such intentionality
can manifest at a psychological level, for example, as the so-called "attentional beam" [15]. Our
framework is also compatible with the general hypothesis that consciousness has evolved as a
mechanism that optimizes information integration [17,35], even though we do not formally relate
our model to this framework here. Furthermore, we do not attempt to elucidate the relationship
between so-called "access consciousness" and "phenomenal consciousness" (see [36]) in the context
of our model. Our view is that (1) phenomenology (or qualitative character, as it is also sometimes
called, e.g., of a tomato on a table, presenting the features of its exposed surface to perception)
normally correlates with (2) related intentional content (e.g., a tomato's-being-on-the-table) and
(3) accessibility (in the global workspace) for further actions (e.g., I can report what I see and how
it looks from my position, decide to pick up the tomato depending on my current narrative). These
components may be dissociable to some extent, but one can think of our model as framing them as
integrated in the overall structure of human conscious experience.
We place an emphasis on the embodied nature of consciousness because we see embodiment as
a strong determinant of its overall structure and dynamics [6]. However, our model does not
reduce consciousness to embodiment in a strong sense, as the workspace relies on multiple layers of
abstraction to represent and control the body, and the model is compatible with multiple forms of
embodiment. Nevertheless, embodied cognition constitutes a framework within which a theory of
consciousness can be derived in an ecological way. Autonomous embodied cognitive systems can be
described as situated agents that operate from a certain location in a specic environment under
particular systemic constraints [6]. They can further be described as performing perceptual and
active inference in order to accumulate and deploy adaptive knowledge about themselves and the
world through their history of interactions with it [6,10]. In the framework of active inference, they
carry out cycles of perception, prediction, and action according to prior beliefs about the self and
the world held in their memory. These priors are constantly being updated and optimized,
increasing the predictive power of internal models of physical and social exchanges with the world
(e.g., energy eciency, group acceptance). The internal models are used to appraise sensory
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evidence in relation to expectations and preferences and to govern action, including behaviors of
approach and avoidance [1, 31,37,38]. The optimization of this overall process of appraisal will
increase the agent's likelihood of remaining within its domain of viability (homeostasis) and
well-being, and help it cope with adverse events by maximizing its resilience [1, 39].
One of the pivotal consideration for the derivation of the PCM is that for such embodied
systems in general, there is an evolutionary advantage of developing an integrative cognition of
space in order to represent, simulate, appraise and control spatially distributed information and
the consequences of actions. Geometries and spaces are important components of the distribution
of information the agents' brains need to determine in order to model relative changes in the
internal and external environments. This need is so engrained that sensory organs have evolved so
as to embed implicit geometrical assumptions (e.g., the vestibular and visual systems), and spatial
cognition has undergone selective pressure throughout evolution to incorporate models of complex
spatial relationships between agents, in the context of the assessment of personally relevant
outcomes (e.g., in prey and predator dynamics and luring strategies) [40]. The need for making
inferences about space strongly suggests the existence of internal predictive models operating over
sensory experience and prior beliefs in memory, through which the world is represented and
interpreted from a situated perspective.
Predictive models about spatial information can be expected across the hierarchy of
neurocognitive processing, including non-conscious levels. But we hypothesize that, at the tip of
the iceberg, consciousness relies on an integrative predictive model attributing a global
3-dimensional spatial geometry to multimodal sensory information and memory traces as they
access the conscious workspace. We also hypothesize that this model serves as a support for the
mapping and appraisal of preferences and personally relevant information. We expect that such a
spatial model oers a parsimonious, minimally complex mechanism, which is consistent with basic
principles of approximate Bayesian inference (and free energy minimization) but also with Occam's
Razor, which governs (statistical or generative) models that optimally generalize to new data [10].
We hypothesize that such global internal model of space operates in a supramodal manner by
dynamically integrating and unifying information from multiple sensory modalities through
aective arbitration [1].
Of course, there is much more to consciousness than spatiality and its valuation. In a normal
human individual, consciousness extends to incorporate dierentiated and sophisticated levels of
representation [28]: from perception to language and mathematical thought. And lived spatiality
must be thought of as integrated with the ow of lived time [7]. But, to begin formulating a
mathematical model of consciousness, it is sound from a phenomenological, functional, and
practical standpoint to consider core consciousness [28] from the perspective of embodied spatial
cognition in the context of active inference, which incorporates complex cognitive dynamics.
Our approach directly connects to a fast growing literature, relating the free energy
principle [10], to perceptual inference, active inference and (embodied) conscious experience. The
framework of free energy driven perceptual and active inference has been used to shed light on
conscious processing, including the structure and unity of consciousness, aspects of the rst person
perspective, self-models, embodiment, interoception, body illusions, and bistability [20{25]. The
PCM advances previous formulations of active inference (in relation to consciousness) by featuring
a mathematical theory, based on projective geometry, of the form, structure and dynamics of
spatial, perceptual, and imaginary experience. In particular, it accommodates counterfactual or
"as if" multi-perspectival transformations of the rst-person perspective in conscious experience. It
species a core mechanism unifying perception, imagination and action for the optimization of the
appraisal of action outcomes, and thus maximizes the overall resilience of an embodied cognitive
system imbued with it. It oers an explicit, formal, computable and integrative account of
embodied consciousness, which links components of the aective sciences, and oers a basis for
testing hypotheses about psychological mechanisms quantitatively.
Our argument follows three basic steps.
First, we assume that conscious processing entails a process of inference, in particular, active
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inference under the free energy principle. It relates the conscious intentional experience of the
world with the products of typically unconscious inference based on sensory evidence.
The second assumption we make follows from the rst, namely, that to make inferences or
predictions any sentient (or conscious) creature must possess a generative model of its sensorium.
In other words, to engage in active inference it is necessary to generate predictions about what
would happen if I did such-and-such. This is necessary for testing internal hypotheses against
sensory evidence and updating one's beliefs (or behavior) accordingly. This ts comfortably with
the Bayesian brain hypothesis [41{43] and more fundamental arguments such as the Good
Regulator Theorem (from early formulations of self-organization) [20,44].
Finally, and most importantly, we posit projective geometry as a necessary form of the
generative model that must be deployed by any conscious organism that navigates a
three-dimensional world. Put simply, to produce generalizable and veridical predictions, the
internal models used by our brain must recapitulate the formal geometry of the world we are
trying to make predictions about (from situated standpoints). In this setting, the Projective
Consciousness Model (PCM) regards projective geometry (in three dimensions) as the optimal
geometry for situated inferences to the best explanation for sensory impressions.
In what follows, we will see that the ability to operate on or within a projective geometry
carries with it all the necessary equipment for the sort of active inference characteristic of beings
like ourselves, in particular, the ability to entertain ctive outcomes and multiple perspectives on
the composition and dynamics of objects causing (or that could cause) sensory input. We focus
here on the projective aspects of generative models and the pre-eminent role of projective geometry
(as opposed to active inference and free energy per se). We suppose that such a geometry must (at
some level) be entailed by the generative models used by the brain (see section on
neurocomputational hypotheses).
1.2 Phenomenological postulates: a mode of access with a characteristic
spatial phenomenology based on perspective taking and driven by
the mapping of personally relevant information
We specify how spatiality is consciously experienced, including one's own body and oneself as
observer [14]. Our goal is to infer from this analysis, moving from what is represented to what
carries out the representing, key computational properties of consciousness that can account for
the generation of its characteristic spatial phenomenology. This will later allow us to make
hypotheses about its neural implementation.
To ground the model, we use the following well-motivated postulates, which distill centuries of
discussions about the structure of subjectivity and consciousness. They feature an integrative
subjective experience with a characteristic spatial phenomenology that is accessed from a specic
perspective (a "point of view"). They were identied prior to any particular mathematical model
from a synthesis of psychology, cognitive neuroscience, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind.
Though not uncontroversial, we accept them here as a plausible starting point from which to draw
out important consequences. (A similar method can be found in [35].)
1.2.1 A 3-dimensional lived space
Investigations into the phenomenology of consciousness have emphasized consciousness as
grounded in a subjective standpoint and a space of sorts, using the basic schematics of a
subject-object opposition and a relation between a center and a periphery [2, 3, 7, 45]. Spatiality is
a pervasive aspect of subjective experience. When one closes one's eyes in a silent room, under
normal conditions, one experiences a "lived space", to adopt a term of art commonly used in the
Phenomenological tradition, the sense of a 3-dimensional surrounding space that is invariant even
as the state of the outside world constantly changes. We nd such a space in both waking
consciousness and in dream. It seems central to conscious experience in general, to the way it
represents a world in three dimensions, in which we locate ourselves and from which we perceive,
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imagine, and plan action [11,14,46{50]. In this context, the particular "way" such a space appears
is considered as an immanent structure of the subjective conscious experience we "live through",
and to which we have phenomenological access; it is not a feature of the world represented [51] (it
only secondarily becomes itself an object of representation, something to which our attention can
be drawn, just as one does not normally notice one's hand in hammering, though one can). As a
rst approximation, lived space can be said to feature, by default, a primarily egocentric
representation of space, dening a peri-personal and an extra-personal environment in relation to a
body, and oriented along directions of perception and action [11,46].
It manifests as a unied, supramodal and normally coherent experience, integrating and
mapping, into a cohesive and continuous global workspace, dierent portions of space, as sampled
by multiple, redundant sense modalities (notably audition and proprioception), and constantly
lled with information from memory to complement the partial sensory sampling (e.g., I'm looking
at a stage and listening to the music playing, but I know and feel that my friend is sitting next to
me). Vision is central to the process, but it is not necessary to it (e.g., blind subjects also have a
rich perception and imagination of objects and of others in space). The visual eld is an
informationally rich and sharp representation of a portion of the ambient space, which is integrated
into the broader, more encompassing conscious experience of a global spatial eld or spatiality,
with a unied frame of reference and a representation of the body [11,48,52]. Thus all sense
modalities, vision, audition, proprioception, vestibular processing, olfaction, touch, but also
interoception are expected to contribute to its ongoing construction in real-time, and to populate
its content adaptively [11,52].
As suggested above, lived space ought not be considered a direct representation of the intrinsic
spatial structure of the world, and can be conceived as an adaptive simulation, "user interface",
projection or controlled "hallucination" that is actively constructed by the brain in
real-time [10,48,53]. Experientially, outside of pathological conditions, it engenders an illusion of
direct realism, (i.e., of being conscious of the world itself directly) [54], which is probably a
necessary condition for eectively representing our real environment and acting within it. But
dreams, imagination, hallucinations, out of body experiences (OBEs), sensory substitution, vertigo,
and various neurological syndromes, provide compelling evidence that our lived,
moment-by-moment representation and subjective experience of ambient physical space is the
construction of a virtual world. In fact, the normal, robust, ongoing conscious experience of
co-localization in space of one's subjective point of view and of one's own body, is contingent upon
a process of multisensory inference, and reects a dynamical balance in sensorimotor
calibration [14,55]. Accordingly, when we use terms like 'embodied', this should not be taken to
commit us to direct realist, externalist, or "extended-mind" theories of conscious perception (see,
for example [56]). In our view, consciousness is a computational process performed entirely within
one's brain; even though, clearly, it bears causal connections to processes that extend well beyond
the brain and, by intentionality, it represents objects, events, and states of aairs that are certainly
not contained within the brain).
1.2.2 An elusive standpoint and a space with a representation of the body at the
center
In default egocentric spatial consciousness, the center of lived space seems to coincide with an
implicit vantage point, somewhat near or intersecting with the perceived location of the head.
Phenomenologically, the vantage point has an ill-dened and elusive localization in the space, even
though it seems to play a central, if usually tacit role, like that of an origin, in the organization of
the space: one can locate objects in space, but one cannot precisely locate the vantage point from
which the representation seems to emerge as a simple location in 3-dimensional space [5, 57]. It
seems to behave like a virtual, internal 3-dimensional camera, which is reminiscent of the
long-debated notion of an "inner eye", the basis of some classical aporias of the theory of
consciousness, (e.g., the homuncular regress problem, the problem of the location of the subject,
and issues surrounding the "Cartesian Theater") [5, 58{60].
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Philosophers have debated over centuries about whether one could nd a "subject" in
consciousness [61{63]. Such a subject would, among other things, provide an origin and foundation
for its lived space. The debate has oscillated between arming and negating its presence [5, 64]. If
it exists, it remains phenomenologically elusive and cannot be accessed like normal objects.
However, the intuition is pervasive and dicult to eliminate, and we wish to investigate whether
we can make sense of it with a mathematical model, bracketing ontological and epistemological
concerns.
Lived space is also characterized by the pervasive presence of a 3-dimensional representation of
the body, which monitors the state and controls the action of the actual body. The existence of
such a lived representation of the body is supported by evidence from perturbations of
proprioception in various experimental and clinical conditions [14], by the pervasive presence of
phantom limbs in amputated patients (which the patients can control to a certain extent as they
would control the missing limb [65]), and by ordinary mental imagery.
In contrast to most contents of consciousness, the lived body is normally always present in the
conscious eld, though, of course, not normally the object of explicit attention or conceptual
representation. Its integrity, as a proxy for the integrity of the actual body, is critical for an
embodied autonomous agent. As a space imbued with value, it is an anchor point for our eorts at
preserving autonomy and well-being. Protecting the actual body in physical space requires an
ongoing monitoring and appraisal of one's own bodily position and state in space in relation to
past, present, and future situations. The lived body is thus a kind of inferential representation of
the real body in physical space, reliant upon memory, anticipation, and ongoing multimodal
sensorimotor information. It constitutes a sort of virtual "user interface" for the representation
and control of the actual body, just like the rest of the global workspace. It can be thought of as a
kind of "virtual body avatar", richly yet selectively informed by multiple sources of
information [14]. We control our limbs through anticipated proprioceptive representations of their
position in space, and we avoid and approach things based on their anticipated potential personal
relevance in connection to their impact on the body.
In normal perception, the lived body manifests as a 3-dimensional phenomenon in a default
egocentric mode, that is, from a rst-person perspective. The representation is informed by
proprioception and interoception and by other sense modalities, like vision, audition, and the
vestibular sense, but also olfaction; all of these act as spatial lters. The lived body and the real
body are related: their referential are "superimposed" via ad hoc calibration for optimal
representation and motor control. This implicit superimposition is dramatically revealed by
phantom limb phenomena.
In imagination, or in abnormal perceptual situations such as body-swap illusions or normal
eects of mirror reections [14,55], the body also manifests as a similar 3-dimensional phenomenon,
under various egocentric and allocentric modes, from rst-person or third-person perspectives. In
spite of their frequent relative separation in lived space during imagination, experimental
situations, or the confrontation with reections, both the implicit vantage point and the
representation of the body generally remain identied as one's own; they preserve their
identication as belonging to the same agent in consciousness.
Such lived representation of one's own body is present in many forms of subjective experience
involving an explicit and reective form of self-consciousness. It is present in mind-wandering,
day-dreaming, and fantasy [66]. It is constantly cast, with more or less emphasis, into the ongoing
narratives and scenarios that we unfold as subjects through imagination in order to aid us in
appraising, interpreting, and manipulating physical and social situations so as to maximize utility,
in a normally highly biased way.
1.2.3 A mechanism for spatial intentionality and perspective taking
Lived space necessarily involves spatial intentionality (i.e., the ability to relate to objects as a
situated observer and to aim at locations in space) and intentionality as an organizing function is
central to consciousness [34]. There is a sense that one's awareness of objects goes out from a
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subject toward an object [2]. This is in evidence in spatial selective attention and is described as
an "attentional spotlight" in the global workspace model [15] (which invokes the metaphors of a
3-dimensional theater with an implicit observer and a stage). In the space of consciousness, points
are not without valence or relation; they are the focus of "beams" of attention or the sources of
such "beams". This spatial intentionality is independent of overt actions or orientation (e.g., head
orientation and saccades). It can operate covertly or overtly across perception, imagination, action
planning and self-representation, and acts as a principle of unication among these processes. It is
key to the control of behavior [67]. We should add that in speaking of 'intentionality' here we have
in mind the general feature of "object-directedness" that is presupposed by all higher forms of
representation. We are suggesting that this "directedness" or "aim" is a fundamentally geometrical
notion that, of course, develops, in conceptual thought and language, well beyond its roots in
perceptual consciousness.
The dynamics of intentionality and orientation in lived space is controlled by a complex
ensemble of parameters, which notably relate to biological constraints, and the ongoing appraisal
of the cognitive and aective personal relevance of objects, spaces and situations (e.g., we pay
attention to what we fear or desire and where it is to be found) [37]. Aective processes, in
connection to memory, have long been conceived as playing a key role in driving intentionality and
consciousness [2, 7, 8, 28].
Perspective taking, the act of representing space and its contents from a particular standpoint
is central to the overall process of comporting oneself in lived space by representing physical and
social relationships across dierent angles [68]. It implements the spatial expression of
intentionality in attention. It is itself driven by the detection of personally relevant information, in
connection to memory. Perspective taking is the common mechanism by which the frames of
reference of perception, imagination, action-programming, and self-representation are related. In
perception, the frame of reference of lived space tends to default to an egocentric stance, with a
rst-person perspective. In imagination, we can adopt any allocentric vantage point: one can
imagine something from somebody else's point of view or an object from a rst-person perspective,
or oneself being represented from a second-person perspective, or oneself relating to another or an
object from a third-person perspective. We also can imagine the points of view of non-human
entities, from tiny animals to a "God", and from any distance (e.g., "at arm's length", "with a
ten-foot pole", "from 30,000 feet").
This implies that possible other perspectives are, in eect, built into lived space. Evolutionary
pressure has been placed on animals to represent themselves from the perspective of another [69]
e.g., the prey as seen by the predator and conversely, which has enabled animals to develop luring
strategies based on anticipation, and to create and exploit perspectival illusions for mating
success [70]. In our model, access to representations of space in consciousness always implies
perspective taking. Creatures with no capabilities for third-person point of view perspective taking
would have a very limited consciousness, as they would be unable to use anticipatory local and
non-local perspective taking to build an integrative representation of their surroundings; thereby
escaping their situated rst-person perspective..
1.2.4 A workspace in perspective with a horizon
In both normal perception and imagination, the experience of spatiality generally follows specic
rules of transformation in which the sense of direction (front, back, up, down, left, right) and of
relations of incidence are preserved. The alignment of objects along a straight line is preserved in
changes of point of view (e.g., when perceiving or imagining roads under dierent points of view).
Likewise, when seeing or imagining an object moving, we normally perceive the incidences of its
parts as being preserved; otherwise the object would lose its unity. From an evolutionary
standpoint, representing objects in a way that preserves relations of incidence is a critical adaptive
feature in a world of inertia, collisions, and encounters. Relations of incidence are personally
relevant for embodied systems.
In lived space, objects, points of view and their relations of incidence are represented with the
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shape of 3-dimensional projections in perspective, along certain directions, from a certain
standpoint; parallel lines converge on an implicit or explicit horizon at innity. It is through the
lens of this inherently perspectival geometry that a world of transcendent 3-dimensional objects in
Euclidean space existing in independence of any particular perspectives (whose sizes remain the
same irrespective of distance) is consciously experienced. This is familiar enough: in one sense,
people "look tiny" from the top of a tower, but one does not think that they have shrunk; railroad
tracks "seem to" converge at the horizon, but one knows they don't. In this space of appearances,
proles, adumbrations, and perspectives, the same objects can be said to grow, shrink, vanish,
occlude one another, be "visible-from-here", "inaudible-from-there", and so on. We hold that this
perspectival mode of representation is true of both perception and imagination (for both concrete
and abstract objects).
Perspectival properties are most obvious in vision (although the extent to which perspectival
properties dominate visual awareness is debated [71]), in which the horizon corresponds to the set
of vanishing points along lines of perspective, e.g., as parallel railroad tracks converge toward a
vanishing point. But as noted, lived space is not reducible to the space of vision. It is a
multisensory, integrated phenomenon, incorporating the visual eld into a larger space and feeding
on sources of spatial sensory sampling other than visual ones. It integrates both perception and
imagination into a common space of inference, and is strongly related to embodied cognition, in
which prehension and locomotion (i.e., actions) are as much central organising factors as
perception or imaginary representations.
One can thus expect that imagination also operates within a perspectival frame of reference,
which can be mapped onto the visual eld or more generally onto the perceived surrounding space.
For instance, when one imagines a cube moving away anywhere around oneself, the imagined cube
appears in imagination to become smaller and smaller as it moves farther away, and it eventually
vanishes into a point as it approaches "innity". This geometrical behavior of the cube is
associated with a sense of depth.
Since objects vanish near innity in all possible directions of lived space, lived space, as a
perspectival space, appears from inside as bounded by a horizon at innity, even though the
horizon may be set very far in the virtual space of consciousness and remain outside or at the
fringes of the scope of attention. We hold that everything present in spatial consciousness is
represented in perspective in relation to this movable horizon no matter its relative position in the
space around us.
Beyond phenomenological considerations, it is important to emphasize that such a
conguration is integral to the mechanism of perspective taking, as it frames all subjective
representations of space along specic directions of aiming from specic vantage points. The
perspectival structure of the lived space that results is part of the implementation as well as an
expression of intentionality in consciousness.
2 Model
2.1 General Rationale
We engage in cognition and act in ambient space in reference to a 3-dimensional Euclidean space
(the ambient physical space may or may not be a 3-dimensional Euclidean space, but assuming a
modest realism, it approximates such a space at the scale relevant to most of our practical
pursuits). Starting from the vital necessity for biological systems to distinguish between changes in
the world resulting from their own motions versus from outside transformations, Poincare showed
the importance of accounting for the relativity of rigid motion between the body and the world in
perception and action programming, which can be made on the basis of the group of displacements
in Euclidean 3-dimensional space [72]. This particular group appears to structure empirical facts,
outside of subjective experience. The action of the group, supported by the Euclidean space,
correlates with the behavior of physical space and of elds of matter and light under relative
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motion.
However, such physical space does not coincide with lived space as experienced in consciousness.
The phenomenological postulates previously reviewed have led us to conclude that the geometry
that characterizes lived space is not Euclidean: it is fundamentally perspectival and represents
objects in ambient space in a manner that is best explained by projective geometry with a
direction of aim and a scope (e.g., "from here" or "over there", or "from here to there"; see [12] for
an historical introduction to projective geometry). It follows that the 3-dimensional characteristic
phenomenology of the lived space is framed by a 3-dimensional projective space and that the
mechanism of perspective taking corresponds to the action of projective transformations. In fact,
the group of projective transformations contains the Euclidean group, thus projective geometry
embeds Poincare's transformations.
We are proposing that the generative models used by conscious creatures are necessarily
equipped with a projective geometry. Note that the generative models in play cover all aspects of
how sensory data are generated. This means that projective geometry constitutes a necessary but
not sucient account of generative models. Having said this, we consider projective geometry to
be quite fundamental for conscious processing in the following sense: we associate conscious
processing with inference about the consequences of action. This sort of inference is necessarily
about the future and therefore acquires a temporal thickness [73]. Crucially, it is the sort of
inference that answers questions like "What would happen if I did that?" The fact that we do
things in a metric space therefore requires counterfactual inference about the future to conform to
a projective geometry. From the perspective of active inference, every (ctive) perspective or view
we take on a scene represents a particular movement or possible action, from which we have to
select the best. This selection constitutes our intention.
Active inference is a corollary of the free energy principle, which subsumes approximate
Bayesian inference and model selection. Common examples of this in the neurosciences include
predictive coding [74,75] and Bayes optimal decision making under Markov decision processes [76].
The PCM incorporates the free energy principle, which mandates that the best perspective is
that which results in the smallest free energy or expected surprise. Because surprise is (in
information theory) self-information, expected surprise is then entropy or uncertainty. This means
that the best among all plausible or allowable perspectives is the perspective that resolves the
greatest amount of uncertainty; thereby providing a formal basis for action selection. Perhaps the
simplest example of this is deciding where to look next. The selection out of all possible saccadic
eye movements can be easily modeled in terms of minimizing expected free energy or uncertainty
in terms of salience; either in continuous state space models [77] or discrete state space
models [76,78,79].
Crucially, expected free energy can always be decomposed into epistemic and pragmatic
parts [78]. The uncertainty reducing component is known as Bayesian surprise, epistemic value,
information gain or salience [80]. The pragmatic part corresponds to expected surprise under prior
beliefs about outcomes; i.e., prior cost. This means that the active inference gracefully subsumes
expected utility theory and related (reinforcement) formulations in behavioral psychology.
However, note that neither expected utility theory or reinforcement learning theory are
equipped with epistemic or uncertainty resolving aspects that are a natural consequence of active
inference, under the free energy principle. We will not develop the mathematical details behind
this aspect of active inference. For details see [10,78]. Our key point is that the machinery that is
necessary to evaluate the expected free energy, under a plausible action or transformation, must
necessarily conform to a projective geometry.
The integration of a global projective geometrical level of representation and control into a free
energy minimization scheme for multisensory inference in relation to preferences must (we assume)
have been shaped through a long process of evolutionary selection to support the generation of
resilient autonomous agents. In this treatment, we have not considered the learning of spatial
transformations. In principle, this is usually subsumed under active inference, where the
parameters encoding allowable transformations within the generative model are learned so that the
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(long-term average) of free energy is minimized. This usually translates into Hebbian or associative
plasticity; for both continuous and discrete state space models [81]. There are supraordinate issues
which we do not address here that concern the epigenetic specication and learning (i.e. Bayesian
model selection) over evolutionary time (i.e., natural selection) [82].
The explanatory work of projective geometry in the context of active inference will be
illustrated using a simple example below (with simulations). At present, we just need to note that
to select actions and navigate in a metric space, it is necessary to implement a projective geometry
to evaluate the consequences of (ctive) narratives. As noted above, an important aspect of this
selection rests upon the salience or epistemic aordance associated with each transformation
entertained.
2.2 Core features of the PCM
This overall framework can be modelled by integrating in a hierarchical manner: (1) a projective
geometry engine, which is embedded into (2) an active inference engine; the two being coupled in
order to access and evaluate information and control action [1] (gure 1). The projective geometry
engine implements a specic kind of geometry, projective geometry, that: (i) is based on
perspective taking, (ii) plays a central role in spatial inference, and (iii) is capable of integrating
perception, imagination and action-programming into a global operational workspace with
seamless relationships between frames of reference. This active inference engine integrates the
geometrical model into the larger framework of free energy driven, active inference, which is used
as a general model of enactive, embodied cognition [6,8,10]. As part of the overall process of active
inference, intentionality, which includes the driving of perspective taking and the motivation of
action, is driven by the minimization of free energy, which directly relates to conditional
probabilities in memory. These probabilities can encode a variety of expectations, including
cognitive and aective preferences, as a function of locations in space. Sensory evidence
contributes to the updating of prior beliefs in memory as the system interacts with its surrounding.
Projective geometry implements a specic mode of access to information that is formatted by
non-trivial projective transformations. It provides the principles by which a variety of
representations or models of the spatial-temporal world, including the body, R(X; t), which are
stored in memory, can be accessed and mapped in the workspace from dierent points of view in
an integrative manner. The process is based on the application of projective transformations T (t),
which implements perspective taking, such that the subjective experience of space at a given
instant corresponds to:
S(X; t) = T (t) R(X; t) [1]
with  denoting the application, similar to an operation of composition, of the projective
transformation T to the spatial world model R, yielding a space equipped with intentional
directions in perspective, featuring observation beams and relating subjective perspectives of
possible observers.
More specically, R(X; t) denotes the state at time t of a set X of internal variables that
describe the environment, external world (for instance the objects in it, but also the elds on it,
such as weather, temperature, light, and so on), and our own body. The state R depends on other
variables Y , such as sensory inputs associated with sensory data D. And S(X; t) denotes another
state at time t of X that represents our subjective experience of the external world (objects in it
and elds over it), and of our own body. The geometrical hypothesis tells that projective
transformations and generalized transformations (for instance the perspective projections, as
further described below), acts as a set of transformations in the manifold of states of X, sending an
unconscious state to a state that is accessible to consciousness.
Moreover, the geometrical hypothesis requires that the full group G of invertible projective
transformations, such as changes of projective frames, is acting on the subjective transformations,
in the following sense: assume the state R is transformed in S = T R by an element T (that can
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be invertible or not), the replacement of T by the conjugated element T1 = g1  T = g1Tg 11 , where
g1 is an invertible element of G, must satisfy the covariant rule: g1  (g2  T ) = (g1g)  T .
This means that conscious states are not very dierent from unconscious ones: they result from
taking a point of view or perspective using projective transformations. The choice of the projective
operation T (t) transforming R(X; t) into S(X; t) can therefore be assumed to rely on unconscious
processing (it can be complex, as we can expect the system to combine several such
transformations across representations of the self, other persons and objects).
A more precise symbolization, but also probably more cumbersome at this stage, should take
into account two sets of variables, X for variables that are almost conscious, and Y for hidden
variables that participate in the denition of X (e.g. related to sensory systems that are far from
conscious access). Then the equation should be S(X; t) = C(T (t); R(X;Y; t)), satisfying, for any g
in G, and state R of X and Y , the equation C(g  T; g R) = g  C(S;R). Importantly, the states
of variables X and Y have to be understood as estimates of probabilities, which in some cases can
be certainties, yielding xed values.
Such projective mode of access presents strong computational advantages, and can seamlessly
relate the spatial frames of perception, imagination and action programming. This model of space
constitutes the spatial eld of consciousness in our theory.
This spatial eld of consciousness (FoC) is controlled by prior beliefs in memory and ongoing
sensory evidence to serve active inference through the minimization of free energy. The process
results in an algorithm of arbitration and learning that optimizes the projective representation of
information (morphological or aective) and the orientation of intentionality (spatial attention and
action programming) within the workspace, specically : (1) adaptive spatial inference (physical
and social) to build spatial knowledge in memory (about shapes, structures, behaviors); and (2)
'personal relevance' as mapped onto spatial knowledge in memory. The embodied agent minimizes
free energy, as related to the discrepancy between beliefs and evidence, and thus optimizes its
representation of spatial information and control of action.
Free energy (FE) is a mathematical way of expressing the surprise or improbability of some
sensory impressions under a particular (generative) model of how those data were generated. In
the PCM, free energy provides an upper bound on surprise or self-information such that:
FE >  logP (DjR;P; T; :::) [2]
P denotes the parameters of the probability laws of the variables associated with R.
This (simple) formulation shows that FE is always greater than surprise. Therefore minimizing
free energy (or selecting transformations T that minimize expected free energy) will always reduce
surprise (or resolve uncertainty). Here, D are sensory data that are available to the active
inference engine. In other words, we associate any possible transformation with a model that, in
practice, would become a hypothesis about "what would happen if I did that". As noted above,
this enables the expected free energy to be associated with any transformation (or its products);
where the products S may also be equipped with prior preferences (i.e., logP (S) of a particular
outcome S that has low cost or surprise).
The relationship between free-energy driven active inference and projective geometry in the
PCM can be formulated as follows. FE minimization is a general expression of Bayesian inference
that incorporates constraints on computational (and statistical) eciency: as with every Bayesian
approach, it relies on a choice of variables to estimate and use internally, and on relations between
them. The form of these variables and relations is crucial. A specic geometry furnishes a way to
make precise and organize this form; in fact a specic geometry denes particular observations to
be made and particular rules prescribing how the observations and priors have to be analyzed. Here
we can refer to Poincare's analysis of the most convenient geometry for managing the ambiguous
relations of individuals with the external world. In the specic case of consciousness, the most
convenient geometry is a projective one, notably because projective geometry is the natural
geometry of arrays of directions from any point to all other points; it relates "me" observing and
"me" being observed together, taking care of several frames of observation from places to places.
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Moreover, free energy minimization oers a highly exible, fully computable framework that
can be associated with concrete algorithms for actually performing quantitative predictions and
advanced simulations of agents implementing the PCM, including in guiding perception, action
and decisions. FE oers a solution to the problem of implementation in addition to having a
strong theoretical back story. The behavior of the model reproduces psychological descriptions
invoking states of aairs of personal relevance (rewards) and utility. It allows us to understand and
manipulate psychological dimensions computationally, based on a general principle of optimization
of resilience, in order to test hypotheses about the role of cognitive and aective processes in
behavior. It also allows us to make connections with brain function and more generally shows how
geometry can be compatible with probabilistic algorithms for learning and decision
2.3 Incorporation of models of appraisal and motivation
The free energy framework combined with projective geometry conveniently enables us to explicitly
incorporate appraisal and motivation theory by setting prior beliefs in memory and rules of
approach and avoidance [28,31,37]. We can thus specify the mechanics of embodied consciousness
and condition perception, imagination and action, based on aective and motivational models,
which can be related to given adaptive goals of survival and well-being, and compared based on
simulation outcomes. We place emphasis on these aective aspects because they are essential
psychological and ethological concepts that a unied computational framework proposed as a
model of embodied consciousness should be able to account for.
We can interpret the free energy framework, under some specications, as implementing an
intuitive notion of 'personal relevance'. The notion subsumes innate and acquired abstract and
concrete 'values' or preferences, yielding cognitive and aective saliencies, as built into the prior
beliefs about the world of a given system. In this context, personal relevance and motivational
valence are scored by the expected free energy under a particular transformation (entertained by
the projective geometry within the generative model). As noted above, the motivational valence or
value is encoded in terms of prior beliefs about (counterfactual) outcomes S, while the personal
relevance of those outcomes corresponds to the salience or epistemic value of reducing uncertainty
about how these outcomes are obtained; i.e., epistemic aordance. Clearly, the salience or
epistemic part of expected free energy is inherently personal, because it corresponds to the
particular viewpoint or perspective implicit in each possible transformation. We operationalize
personal relevance as the negative logarithm of a eld of conditional probabilities that represent
prior beliefs; namely, events with a given aective and motivational valence for the agent or 'value'
will occur across a given portion of space. This constitutes a belief system or hypotheses about the
world stored in the agent's generative model. Through active inference the agent confronts its
beliefs with a given 'factual' world, which corresponds to sensory evidence that can be
'experienced' by the agent as a result of its sensory coupling with the world. Beyond appraisal and
motivation, notions of motor commands and sensorimotor forward and inverse modeling can be
naturally incorporated into the free energy framework, and become integral to the design and
understanding of specic systems performing active inference. In active inference, motor
commands become descending predictions of proprioceptive (or interoceptive) signals, which elicit
motor (or autonomic) reexes [83{85]. By the same token, corollary discharge becomes the
corresponding descending predictions from the generative model to exteroceptive modalities (e.g.,
what things would look like if I moved there) [79]. The PCM can thus perform active inference
within the real (e.g. through robotics) or simulated (e.g. through virtual reality) environments
that dene a space of interaction and a world model.
2.4 The Field of Consciousness in the PCM
Thus the minimization of free energy drives perspective taking by setting the parameters of the
projective transformation T based on a combination of cognitive and aective parameters, related
to the expectations of the system. This process plays a central role in intentionality and the
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motivation of action. For instance, typically, we want to move away from that scary thing over
there we believe to be dangerous, we want to move closer to one who attracts us, we stay put to
continue what we are enjoying as long as other motives do not interfere. In the process we sample
sensory evidence and revise our prior beliefs accordingly, and consciousness helps to transform
implicit computations into explicit ones that are sensitive to observations.
In the PCM framework, under the minimization of free energy, the FoC is not only a spatial
eld, but also an integrated "force eld". The agent is governed by a dynamical system that drives
the mechanics of its embodied consciousness through perspective taking across virtual and real
spaces, to maximize spatial knowledge and personal relevance and control action. We note that our
model does not oer an explanation as to why the force eld is phenomenally conscious; it limits
itself to addressing why consciousness has the shape and dynamics of such force elds. The spatial
gradient of free energy corresponds to the spatial gradient of preferences.
The overall FoC at each instant, including the agent's intentionality (i.e., the direction of its
aim), is driven by the dynamic interplay of ongoing multisensory information, memory and
aective biases, and serves to appraise and decide on the adequate course of action, based on
accumulated, anticipated and observed information. By combining spatial and aective priors
under the free energy principle, we can specify the principle of action that governs embodied
intentionality and actual action in our model, in a way for instance that minimizes the likelihood
of unexpected and adverse events and maximizes positive outcomes for the embodied system. The
framework allows us to encode space (including shapes) and aective valuation together, so that
active inference relies on an "aesthetic" process so-to-speak, which is consistent with the strong
link between spatial and emotional memory in neuroscience [7].
When we associate transformations with an attentional beam, we are appealing to the notion of
attentional salience and to the epistemic value entailed by minimizing expected free energy [79].
This should not be confused with the perceptual attention to ascending sensory streams; usually
cast in terms of precision weighting in predictive coding formulations of active inference [86]. This
means the attentional beam corresponds to the epistemic aordance that characterizes a particular
transformation and ensuing perspective on the world.
2.5 Illustration of the PCM
gure 1 illustrates the general properties of the PCM from a phenomenological standpoint. The
subjective experience of space and its contents as perceived (continuous funnels on the gure) or
imagined (dashed funnels), i.e., lived space S for short, are framed in, and experienced as, a
3-dimensional projective space (blue spheres) in perspective, through a mechanism of perspective
taking. Personal relevance (as associated with sensory qualities and feelings in conscious
experience) is represented in the colors on the manikins. Perspective taking is governed by
projective transformation T , which is applied to the current world-model R in memory, under the
inuence of executive functions, emotions, and ongoing multisensory integration. The minimization
of free energy drives the dynamics of the system, including the sequence of perceived or imagined
projective scenes (i.e., little mind movies) that plays out in its consciousness in an emotionally
charged context. The overall process is implemented through the coupling of (a) a real-time
projective geometry engine, performing subjective framing and rendering, and (b) an active
inference engine, appraising perceived and imagined projected situations based on internal models
and prior beliefs. The body is represented and experienced as a central reference in the space, and
the visual eld is only a part of lived space.
gure 1. Overall sketch of the model. A. Lived space S (blue spheres): subjective
experience of space and its contents as perceived (continuous funnels on the gure) or imagined
(dashed funnels). It is framed in, and experienced as, a 3-dimensional projective representation in
perspective of a world model R(X; t) associated with a distribution of free energy (FE) in space,
related to cognitive and aective personal relevance (colors on the manikins and door, and disk
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with color gradient). Perspective taking and the selection of corresponding projective
transformations T are governed by the gradient of free energy across space FE. The diagram with
the arrows in circle represents the possible transitions of state: form perception to imagination and
action, for the Field of Consciousness (FoC), which is partially driven by sensory evidence when it
is focused on perception of the local environment, and entirely driven by prior beliefs in memory
and simulation capabilities when it is focused on imagination of non-local spaces (e.g. when we
imagine ourselves at home while we are at work, in the present, past or future), which cannot be
based on direct sensory evidence. |colorredThe FE dening the optimal perspective at a given
instant is globally minimized, through cycles of perception, imagination and action, across time.
The bar graph represents FE, as a function of time and of the dierent perspectives and processing
modes (P: perception versus I: (non-local) imagination) adopted by the system (see text). B.
Overall diagram of the active inference engine, embedding the projective geometry engine for
subjective rendering, confronting prior beliefs with multisensory information and driving learning
and action. The overall process minimizes free energy.
An hypothetical scenario can be used to illustrate the basic operation of our model (see gure 1).
A loud explosive noise from behind captures the attention of a man governed by the model (blue
manikin). He stands in a living room with an open door in the back (as an accessible knowledge
R(X) stored in his memory)(gure 1-a left-tier)(t0  t1). Alarmed by this stressor (free energy is
increased), he starts imagining (the projective geometry engine is solicited) that he might be under
attack (he has a strongly biased prior belief that one can now be attacked anytime anywhere from
behind, based on what he recently saw on TV and heard on the radio repeatedly). This anticipated
attack manifests in his momentary consciousness as a mental projection S(X; t2) = T (t2) R(X; t2)
of a spatial representation R(X; t2) of the imagined situation, which is construed from a certain
imaginary standpoint (embedded in T (t2)). The man does not confuse this counter-factual
imaginary projection with a perception (he is not hallucinating): we assume that as long as
perception is tied to direct sensory evidence ones believes that one knows what one seems to be
perceiving, and thus also knows what one does not seem to be perceiving, in particular when
information is based on long-term memory access, so that the counterfactual scenario imagined is
known not to be among the situations currently perceived. As part of a process of active inference,
the projection nevertheless demands action in order to confront predictions with sensory evidence.
The man expects, when he will have turned around, to see another man (red manikin) pointing
a loaded gun at his head, in front of the only door (t3). He slowly starts to turn around (body
action and Rot(theta)), hindered by a sharply growing fear (free energy spikes very high)(gure 1-a
right-tier). He imagines a possible more positive outcome, preparing accordingly for action: to run
away through the door and escape the danger (free energy is reduced slightly by anticipating this
scenario)(t4). But instead of this dire outcome, as he now stands in front of the door (following
body action)(t5), he sees the door but no gunman in front. There is a strong smell of plastic
smoke, the TV is on the ground broken. The cat (green gure) jumps out of nowhere and runs
away, which he sees rst, then only hears, and all of which he perceives as one unique scene in his
global consciousness of space, S(X; t5) = T (t5) R(X; t5). He now understands that the cat must
have managed to make the TV fall to the oor, causing the loud explosive sound. Relieved (FE is
lowered), he now smiles at his mistaken panic-attack, staring emptily at the door, updating his
prior beliefs in memory (i.e., reappraising) towards the greater likelihood of one's cat messing
around than of being attacked at home.
2.6 3-dimensional projective structure of the FoC
Here we further specify the geometry embedded in the PCM as a model of the subjective
experience of embodied consciousness that denes the FoC.
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2.6.1 The FoC as a 3-dimensional projective space
Technically, a projective n-space Pn can be dened on elds of numbers K, as the collection of all
lines that go through the origin of the vector space eV = K(n+1). Thus by denition,
Pn(K) := (K(n+1) n 0)= , with n0 expressing through a set subtraction symbol n that the origin of
the space is excluded from the projection. This is because if 0 were included, all the points would
become equivalent. The symbol = , expresses the equivalence relation which relates points along
the same vector lines. The vector space eV has one more dimension than the projective space P(eV ).
In what follows we only consider the case of the eld R of real numbers, which is a model of
continuity. Moreover we will mainly limit ourselves to n = 3.
In a projective space, the projective subspaces are dened as the sets of lines that belong to
vector subspaces of R(n+1). For instance, a projective line is the set of lines through 0 in a 2D
plane, a projective plane is the set of lines through 0 in a 3D space, and so on. Hyperplanes
correspond to subspaces of codimension one. When a hyperplane is selected, chosen with an
equation that denes it in R(n+1), its complementary subset in the projective space Pn has the
structure of an ane space En (associated with the corresponding vector subspace of dimension n
as a space of translations). Then parallel lines in En converge toward vanishing points p1 at
innity, the set of which denes the horizon hyperplane.
2.6.2 The FoC under the action of projective transformations
Projective spaces and representations in projective spaces are ruled by the action of projective
transformations from the Projective Linear Group PGL(eV ). These transformations govern global
changes of perspective taking. Key parameters of the generative models that we consider thus
become projective transformations T . One practical advantage is that linear algebra and matrix
operations can be used to represent the whole process.
For a projective space in 3 dimensions, the group corresponds to the set of all 4 4 invertible
transformation matrices M , which transform points in the ambient space (represented by
homogeneous coordinates), to points in projective space, through changes in perspective taking in
a 4-dimensional space (M is a subset of the possible transformation matrices T , which include
non-invertible transformations). The group includes all ane transformations (rotations,
translations, shearing and scaling) and projective transformations that dene direction of aiming
and perspective in the space while preserving relations of incidence, without necessarily preserving
the plane at innity. The reciprocal switch between points of views is governed by simple
projective parameters. All possible projections are thus related via a set of transformation
matrices, which are invertible and can be estimated. In this context, T denotes such an invertible
transformation g, which corresponds to an invertible matrix Mg in PGL(eV ).
It is also important for the model to include generalized projective transformations in the
projective space P. They correspond to non-invertible 4 4 matrices dierent from 0, or
non-invertible linear applications of R4. A particular case is the projection from a point O in P; in
this case the kernel of the associated linear map is the vectorial line corresponding to O. From a
plane to another plane it is an ordinary perspective, the most usual for drawing, that projects the
horizontal plane, including its horizon at innity, to the vertical plane in front of the implicit point
of view.
A fundamental result of projective geometry is that all projective transformations from a given
plane to another plane, i.e., a transformation that preserves pencils of lines, sending lines to lines,
are obtained by composition of usual perspective transformations centered at variable points [87].
2.7 Relations between FE, projective geometry and the optimisation of
preferences in the PCM
The projective geometry engine serves as a unied level of representation and control for the
integrative process of active inference: (1) about the causes of limited sensations and the uncertain
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consequences of action [10,88,89]; and (2) about the gradient of personal relevance in space in
relation to embodied cognition and multiple dimensions of appraisal [7, 8, 26, 28,31,37,90].
It provides the agent with a method of situated representation of space based on which the
process of active inference can progressively build an integrative non-local representation R of the
Euclidean world, which can be associated with indices of personal relevance, or likelihoods of
aectively valenced events in memory based on the FE framework. R and its valuation are not
directly accessed in consciousness as such, as they correspond to the entire relational knowledge
and beliefs potentially available to the system (or a subset of it). Conscious access is always a
contextual, situated process, which builds upon perceptual inference [22], using perspective taking
to support generalizations and action programming.
There is a one-to-one mapping in the PCM between the elements of R in space and the
valuations in memory of cognitive and aective personal relevance across levels of appraisal. The
projective representation S acts as a spatial lter, which frames both the world model R and the
associated mapping of preferences encoded in the prior beliefs in memory. This provides a principle
of driving for perspective taking across perception, imagination and action that orients
consciousness according to the expected spatial distribution of preferences. Through FE, the
process is tuned to be sensitive to surprise, that is, the discrepancies between expectations in
memory, e.g., as accessed through conscious imagination, and the actual state of aairs, as
perceived. The balance between discrepancy and conrmation contributes to drive the parameter
of "free energy".
As a generative model is learned by revision of priors or "Bayesian updating" under the driving
of free energy, minimizing free energy corresponds to optimally approximating the true posterior
probability of the state of the eectively observed world, both in terms of content and personal
relevance in our model. Free energy minimization thus operates as a biased operator of knowledge
generation (biased by preferences) when associated with a mechanism for updating prior beliefs.
In this general framework, "active" inference (which implies actual or imaginary motion) is a
method of optimization for the collection of observations (e.g., from sensory data D), aimed at
updating previously estimated rules for hidden variables (e.g., the world model R) and parameters
(e.g., valuations of locations and objects). It selects observations which are best predicted [10,91].
In some sense, this is a reverse optimization algorithm, or an optimal conditioning for further
likelihood maximization. Importantly, in this framework, violations of expectation can be resolved
through two complementary strategies: (i) to a revision of prior beliefs (e.g., internal models of the
world) or reappraisal (depending on learning rules), in order to ameliorate prediction by reshaping
memory; or (ii) to adaptive actions aimed at conrming prior expectations, thus enacting biases of
the system (e.g., which can lead sometimes, in relation to learning parameters, to ignoring part of
the world because it does not match prior perspectives).
As a result, the system maintains a dynamical balance between, on the one hand, the use of
xed prior beliefs to resolve uncertain situations, and on the other hand, the update of prior beliefs
based on new evidence that violates expectations or preferences. The arbitration of this balance
governs the choice between strategies of cognitive reappraisal or of active approach or avoidance. It
can be expected to vary broadly depending on the design, experience, developmental emotional
history, and current situation of the system. Nevertheless, in nature, the situatedness, autonomy,
embodiment, and limited processing power, memory and energy of embodied autonomous systems,
as well as the relative stability of their environments, can be expected to make biases or prior
beliefs carry a heavy weight in inference and choice, and to impose a slow and reluctant process of
updating, in many contexts. In other contexts (like the resolution of everyday perceptual
uncertainty) the updating is normally rapid and eager.
Free energy thus functions as a control parameter, which arbiters and motivates, like a tension
to reduce the (costly) implementation of changes in the embodied agent's states, through cognitive
reappraisal or adaptive action, as they appear necessary to reduce past, current or anticipated
violations of expectations. In our model, free energy fuels and puts stress on the workload of the
inference engine and drives learning. Minimizing free energy amounts to maximizing the predictive
16/47
power of internal models in memory (including prior goals and preferences) in relation to sensory
information. Because of its intensive dimension and driving role in active inference, free energy can
be interpreted from a psychological standpoint, as contributing to attentional drives, emotions and
the motivation of reappraisal or action.
The concept of free energy straightforwardly subsumes key features of emotion, as a
motivational force for reappraisal and action. It can be expected to relate to a feeling of anxiety
when it increases as the embodied agent misses its objectives, motivating the agent to act, or
paralyzing it but forcing it to reappraise its predicament; or to feelings of relief as FE decreases
when everything turns out to be ne, perhaps as initially expected or hoped in
imagination [9, 92,93] (see gure 1 and accompanying scenario).
One key specication on the free energy framework in the PCM is that it drives intentionality
(the "aiming at" function in the conscious eld) and the corresponding perspective taking (the
specic projective transformation T ): gradients of free energy across space, as mapped in memory
and evidenced through sensory sampling, directly drive the selection of T and of the corresponding
possible direction of perception and action. Free energy minimization thus performs an
optimization of intentionality in the conscious eld, which behaves similarly to the needle of a
compass aligning with the magnetic eld. The algorithm selects the perspective (and
corresponding projective transformation) that minimizes the total amount of free energy associated
with objects under the scope of the current eld of consciousness, acting like a magnifying device,
tuning down everything that is not directly under its lens (see [88] for a related discussion at a
dierent level of integration). This results in the optimization of personal relevance according to
specic preferences: e.g., we look towards the fridge when we are hungry, and listen to the people
behind that are talking about us. For instance, a high likelihood of positive personal relevance
(e.g., pleasantness and safety) in consciousness will be associated with a low level of free energy,
whereas a low likelihood of positive personal relevance will be associated with a high level of free
energy (or stress). These dynamics operate across perception, imagination and action. Free energy
itself is not directly accessible to consciousness, and its minimization process relies on unconscious
activities. However, part of the knowledge that evolves through the optimization process becomes
conscious, and this part necessarily involves the embedding in a lived workspace.
2.8 Projective geometry as an optimal tool for embodied active
inference
From the standpoint of natural selection, given the central role of spatial inference in our model,
the phenomenology of consciousness is expected to present strong and specic computational
advantages, especially for spatial inference itself. Projective geometry implements a framework
that enables intentionality, perspective taking and action planning in the system, in a manner that
can be driven according to the globally optimal principles of free energy minimization. But
projective geometry in and of itself is also optimal for a variety of problems pertaining to situated
spatial inference. In other words it is the best geometrical model to perform spatial inference from
situated perspectives [13].
In the context of active inference, the inference engine must progressively update the
representations R stored in memory, by building a more and more comprehensive representation of
the spatial and temporal world, based on a limited amount of situated observations, and a set of
preferences. In the process, the engine selects situated perspectives, (i.e., transformations T ),
which optimize the acquisition of new multisensory spatial information D, based on available prior
knowledge, and under the driving of some contextual mapping of personal relevance. For example,
I'm curious, I see a door in front of me, I don't know yet what is behind it; I can perhaps expect a
small room that I represent in my mind from dierent perspectives compatible with my
expectations, which will be confronted with the actual structure of the room soon by my opening
the door and entering in order to update my world model R accordingly. Such a problem of spatial
inference can be optimally solved using projective geometry as a computational method.
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Projective geometry is optimal for forward and inverse modeling in space, because it enables the
manipulation of a rich set of frames of reference.
Thus by combining a given set of perspectives from perception using projective geometry, a
system can progressively infer a broader and more precise representation of the 3-dimensional
world, in a manner that is independent of the particular point of view and that can be stored in
memory for future retrieval. Such spatial inferences can be carried out based on epipolar geometry,
which is part of projective geometry, and can be formulated as a multiview process relying on the
theory of abstract cameras [13]. It is computationally tractable, as it can be approximated with
linear algebra. It is reliable, as the shape and distribution of objects in 3-dimensional space can
always be inferred through projective transformations and a small set of additional priors. The
approach is analogous to the methods used for the 3-dimensional mapping of objects, e.g., from
sets of 2-dimensional pictures [13], as used in architecture, virtual reality, engineering and in
industry (more generally, projective geometry is the basis of Computer Graphic Imaging (CGI)
and computer vision).
Moreover, with projective geometry, the frames can link complex perceptions with complex
predictions and actions in a seamless way in order to explore and build a representation of the
environment. (Higher dimensional projective spaces might need to be considered to account for the
multiple dimensions of consciousness [consistent with multimodal sensorimotor integration], but
the essential characteristics of the phenomenology we focus on here, the 3-dimensional lived space,
can be understood by considering 3-dimensional projective space).
Given estimated sensory data D(t1) and internal model R representing the state of objects in
space, it is possible to estimate multiple possible perspectives on the current world-model within
projective spaces and to estimate the projective transformations induced by displacements of the
frame from one place to another one in the space. This estimation produces the expected values of
the sensory data D(t2) after displacement. The system can then use a set of real displacements
and compare the new sensory changes with the predicted observations expected from new points of
views. The whole process relies on the general role of geometrical invariance in the preparation of
action and the prediction of the eect of actions on perceptions [94]. These mathematical
properties allow the system to run a continuous optimization process that updates the hidden rules
and the internal model based on spatial cognition.
2.9 From the PCM to an analytic denition of perception, imagination,
and action
The question of the distinction between perception and imagination has been a classic topic of
debate in philosophy, psychology, and phenomenology [95{98]. A model of consciousness should be
able to account for their distinctions and relations, for the unity of intentionality and lived space
across these forms of consciousness, and for how they relate to action. The PCM suggests a way, in
connection to active inference, of understanding this in a formal manner, which we use later on to
account for psychological phenomena.
2.9.1 Perception
Perception can be associated with a specic subset of generalized projective transformations, the
perception spectrum for short (these transformations do not belong to the proper projective linear
group and correspond to linear projectors parallel to a line on a hyperplane equipped with a
Cartesian frame, see the section on the workspace under the action of projective transformations).
(1) The point of view is located close to or within the space occupied by the head of the body in an
egocentric mode. In normal conditions, this means that the projection operates from an embodied
rst-person perspective, with the real body as a physical referential, and the virtual body being
correspondingly centered. Such setup provides optimal conditions for construing perceptual
evidence, as it registers the center of projection in space with respect to the locations and
directions of the sampling of space that is performed by actual sensory interfaces (e.g., the eyes,
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ears and the body envelop with the skin) based on sensory data D, which incorporate intrinsic
constraints of orientation and calibration related to their source organs. (2) The frame is oriented
in relation to the body referential and main axes: the aiming or "look-at" projective vector tends
to point frontward by default, but this may be modulated by attention, and the up-vector is
normally dened from inertial information (e.g., the direction of gravity sensed by the vestibular
system). (3) The projection parameters (e.g., eld of view, perspective) are set to a specic
calibration range (e.g., encompassing the visual eld).
At each cycle of perceptual inference, the system must identify the projective transformation T
that will best t sensory data D, given its sensorimotor state. Forward models of sensory organs
and processing are expected to serve as priors, in order to reduce the search space for T . With
such priors, perceptual access can assume a xed subset of possible projective transformations T to
explain sensory data D, as sampled by sensory organs and conditioned by internal priors R, and
can quickly focus attention on personally relevant information. In other words, perceptual access,
which must be as close as possible to real-time processing, operates based on a regularization
principle, in order to solve the inverse problem of representing the 3-dimensional spatial causes of
D in the workspace, and framing them according to personal relevance. Only transformations TP
from the perception spectrum will normally be selected for forward modeling. (We note that our
notion of "sensory data" here is neutral with respect to various competing theories of perception.
We are not committing ourselves to classical sense-datum theories. See [99] for some discussion.
All we need here is the idea that in one way or another the sensory organs provide an independent
source of input and correction for the continually updated world model we describe.)
2.9.2 Imagination
The imagination can be associated with the full group of projective transformations PGL(P ), and
generalized projective transformation as well, the imagination group for short. It includes all
possible compositions of perspectives from higher dimensional spaces, inducing changes of frames
in the space, including the "God's eye point of view" near innity, which oers a view of almost
the entire space, from any possible direction. It can be applied to conscious access in the context of
a representation of a world R that can be realistic or a fantasy world.
In the PCM, the imagination serves as a space for inference, based on anticipations and
simulations of the self vis--vis itself and the world. It is used: (i) to assess past, present, and future,
physical and social scenarios according to personal relevance; (ii) to learn from experience by
updating internal models in memory accordingly; and (iii) to program future actions based on the
simulation of multiple perspective changes.
The imagination group can be seen as the perception spectrum of external consciousnesses or
points of view on the space. It notably includes transformations of the observer itself, in particular
of its location in and outlook on the space. It can always be used to infer how a scenario would
look under perceptual constraints, from an egocentric, rst-person perspective. Transformation
matrices can be computed and applied in order to compare perceptual situations (e.g., after
motion), with imaginary situations (e.g., as anticipation of perception before motion).
2.9.3 Perception versus imagination: computational complementarity
Computational similarity: implications for inference .
In this framework, imagination and perception appear fundamentally related through projective
geometry. Mathematically, they correspond respectively to the full projective group and to the set
of projections from points to planes. They share projective transformations to seamlessly interact
across the projective workspace, via the operation of perspective taking. This relationship is
essential in the process of active inference through which the agent accumulates spatial knowledge
about the self and the world. Actual perceptions can be compared to anticipations of perceptions
based on imagination, in order to revise prior beliefs and further minimize free energy.
19/47
Computational simplicity: an attentional lter .
The projective setup makes comparing perception and imagination computationally simple.
Sensorimotor contingencies can be used for the calibration of a consistent metric in the projective
space. This can be done based on a unit spherical geometry in the 4-dimensional real vector space
(such a geometry is well adapted for vision, in which distances are measured with angles).
Alternatively, it can be done by choosing a plane at innity and a Euclidean distance in ane
space (which is adapted to voluntary motion of the body).
Projective spaces then oer natural error metrics, which are based on an intuitive space of
objects in perspective that can directly be compared, for instance using measures of distances
between shapes in perspective (e.g., the point-to-point dierence between the expected smile and
the blank face one receives). Because the space is in perspective, carrying out the comparison in
projective spaces automatically down-weights the importance of information that is located farther
away in relation to the attentional scope: the precision or sensitivity to spatial discrepancies or
noise is larger for near objects than far objects. The scope of the projection thus acts like a lens
and an attentional lter, rendering it a powerful computational tool.
Dierences: role of imagination in expanding operational knowledge and energy
saving .
Imagination and perception are nevertheless clearly distinguished in the model. The respective
weights of sensory data D versus data from episodic and semantic memory (as opposed to sensory
buers), in the current denition of the accessed R, as well as that of dierent prior beliefs about
possible transformations T for perspective taking, form multiple levels of constraint for the
distinction between perception and imagination. In perception, D drives the inference. In
imagination, contrary to perception, the agent builds its representations of a local world more
based on data from memory and internal simulations than on online sensory data D. Consistent
with these distinctions, in sleep, the precision (i.e., weight) aorded to sensory data is attenuated
through neuromodulatory mechanisms, permitting a ctive exploration of projective geometry that
can take on a fantastical aspect as we dream, all the more as intentionality, perspective taking and
actions are driven by a purely imaginary eld of personal relevance [100].
Another important dierence between perception and imagination is that imagination, contrary
to perception, can be deployed in a manner that is largely free from physical and inertial
constraints (e.g., one can jump to the Moon in a fraction of a second), including constraints on the
calibration of the frame of reference itself. It is also true about social constraints that can be
released in imagination. In contrast, perception must submit to the independent order of the
physics of inertia in the world within which it is operating. The imagination allows the agent to
explore multiple possible worlds and actions without having to visit them and act (i.e., with less
consequences). It is a framework for the optimization of action plans, which will de facto minimize
energy expenditure.
2.9.4 Action
Embodied autonomous agents need to act based upon their inferences. Programming or predicting
action requires the extraction of parameters of motion. According to the model, conscious access
carries out a projective mapping S = T R of a representation R of the local world (including the
body), according to cognitive and aective preferences. This representation is itself a mapping of a
locally Euclidean, ambient ane space E3, corresponding to the physical space. The projective
space P and its ane subspace E3 are linked by geometry. Passing from one to the other only
requires linear algebra and adequate calibrations of the respective frames of reference (e.g., between
the distance I cover in the real world and the distance I seem to cover in projective space). Such
calibration needs to be actively performed by dedicated systems (e.g., the cerebellum)(gure 3).
The projective linear group P contains all the Euclidean transformations of the ane subspace
E3. With proper calibration, transformation matrices embed the main parameters of displacements
in E3: translations, rotations, and twists. The parameters of real motion can thus be estimated for
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action from imagination-based projections of the motion, with a corresponding series of projective
transformations anticipating perception. The system can always predict based on its internal
models, how the environment will appear from a given position, by choosing the corresponding
transformation T at any point in time, and by using it to extract the parameters of motion. The
system will thus be capable of imagining optimal navigation paths based on its current
representation of the local world R.
The classical concept of eerence copy [101] denotes an internal sensorimotor prediction
accompanying an order of movement, aimed at preparing the organism for a new expected state,
and serving as a reference for control. Eerence copy informs the central nervous system about the
active contribution of the subject in the perceptual process. Part of the concept can be
reformulated projectively. The projective workspace acts like a space of prediction. It uses a set of
projective transformations T I to predict how R should appear after motion under a new
standpoint. This prediction corresponds to a projective notion of eerence copy in our model.
After eective motion, such an eerence copy embodied in imagined motion can be directly
compared to perception-based projections in the projective workspace. Furthermore,
transformation matrices, accounting for the dierence between actual and anticipated perception,
can be computed based on projective geometry, and used in order to compensate for the errors of
prediction in action consequences, e.g., in relation to un-modeled perturbations in motion. Note
that in the programming of action the minimization concerns the expected free energy, not the
actual free energy. Alternatively, the predicted sensory data under a posterior belief about a
transformation could be realized automatically through motor reexes (or saccadic eye movements;
see above). This is the tenet of active inference in which descending predictions or eerence copies
provide references or set points for (reexive) action.
2.10 The imagination: an algorithm for escaping local minima of free
energy in the FoC
.
The arbitration of the balance between remote imagination (in time or space) versus local
perception is critical for adaptation. In the PCM the FoC shifts between the two processes. This
capacity to switch between local and non-local processing functions as an optimization algorithm:
when the local FoC does not yield a better minimization of free energy, i.e., increases preferences,
non-local imagination can take over.
The stability of free energy across time can be used as a higher-order control parameter to
motivate a switch from a local perception mode to a remote imagination mode during which the
agent scans its memory (its current prior belief map) to identify occluded or distant locations at
which personal relevance would be better optimized. The switch can be implemented based on the
monitoring of the stability of free energy across time. Stable free energy throughout exploration of
the local environment in the FoC suggests that no further optimization of the FoC can be expected
locally. When the local FoC and its immediately reachable surroundings do not provide the agent
with access to locations that increase preferences, the best strategy for the embodied agent is to
search beyond its situated perspective by projecting itself away. When in a certain range of
stability of FE, the system projects itself at remote locations from dierent perspectives, searching
for the direction of maximal utility, i.e., minimal free energy, and programs action accordingly,
based on its belief in memory. It is an empirical fact that imagination is often triggered by a lack
of change in the environment, e.g., during low-level repetitive tasks, which induce
mind-wandering [66].
In the PCM, when free energy becomes too stable (e.g., as measured with rst-derivative
stability analysis), the system may be trapped in a local minimum with no better perspectives. For
instance, when the embodied agent cannot nd a location to optimize its situation, i.e., FE does
not decrease, the system might wander around its immediate location aimlessly, which, interpreted
psychologically, may translate into feelings of panic, hopelessness or boredom, depending on the
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level of baseline free energy. More generally, we expect the dynamics of free energy to relate to
basic and social emotions such as surprise, fear, anxiety, relief, joy, sadness, shame and pride, in
the driving of perception, imagination and action.
In line with these ideas, free energy derivatives (i.e., the changes in free energy as a function of
time) have been proposed to be related to aective valence, and to control through their dynamics,
the elicitation, expression and transition of various aective and motivational states [92,93].
In the PCM, the imagination thus belongs to a class of optimization algorithms that
incorporates mechanisms to mitigate the risk of solutions that are trapped in a local minimum of
energy. Through active inference, and the ensuing balance between exploration and exploitation,
the system further maps the free energy landscape, using actions and updating prior beliefs, in
order to further optimize its FoC. Free energy (and its derivatives) can be thought of as a state or
phase space shaped by a landscape of conditional probabilities that describes where perception,
imagination and action are most likely to rest or move to and from. The ongoing intentional state
of aiming ensuing from FE minimization projects the agent across this space, making it move
towards states, or attractors, further minimizing free energy, either through cycles of action and
perception or through imagination. This renders the capacity for resilience of the system globally
optimal.
2.11 The body model as the central reference of the space and its
projective avatars
The PCM as presented so far generates a workspace embedding a mechanism of conscious access to
spatial information in perspective, based on perspective taking, and driven by the minimization of
free energy in relation to encoded personal relevance in space. In embodied systems, consciousness
as a level of representation is also characterized by the pervasive presence of a 3-dimensional
representation of the body (see postulates above), which is itself a space of high personal relevance.
2.11.1 The body as a projection in conscious access
Applying our model, we hold that the body at stake in subjective experience is of a projective
nature: it is accessed in consciousness projectively, like other objects in space, in perception,
imagination and action. This hypothesis implies that there is a body model (or schema) B that is
embedded in the current representation R of the surrounding world, serving as a mobile referential
in the space [11,28,102]. It also implies that the body model and its dynamics are projectively
mapped into the conscious workspace based on the application of projective transformations T , to
control perspective taking, according to S(B) = T B. (Technical remark: here, for clarity, we
separate B from R, but we could introduce the part XB of internal variable X that concerns the
body, and keep R for denoting the complete state (probabilistic law) of all variables, including XB.)
In normal perception, the set of projective transformations used for bodily conscious access will
correspond to the perception spectrum, yielding an egocentric, rst-person perspective access to
the body in space. In imagination and action, the full projective group can be used for perspective
taking on a 3-dimensional representation of the body. In abnormal conditions, many dissociations
and personally relevant violations of expectations can be envisioned between the real body and the
projected-perceived and projected-imagined bodies.
The body model nevertheless plays the role of an essential reference in the space, irrespective of
perspective taking: we always know where to nd it in normal conditions, no matter how
unfamiliar our surrounding environment may become. It is animated and updated in real-time in
consciousness based on multisensory information D.
2.11.2 The projective body, emotion and feeling
The body model and its internal structures dene at each instant portions of space, which are
imbued with personal relevance: it is the core space for the experience of pleasure and pain, and
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for the interoceptive, homeostatic monitoring of the health and well-being of the agent [28].
As an integrated representation and a critical asset for the embodied system, the projective
body serves utility and adaptation, in both physical and social contexts. It is the object of
constant aective appraisals [30, 90,90,103], and is highly valuated. As part of core consciousness,
it is a space of experience, which, through interoceptive sensations, emotion and feeling notably,
often reect the consequences and discrepancies of actual and imagined actions [28]
But we can further wonder how feelings themselves as subjective experiences could be conceived
in this projective framework. We suggest that bodily feelings can be in part characterized by a
spatial phenomenology. We experience our body as a sounding board [104], and bodily feelings are
perceived as partly localized in the body compartment, in relation to specic organs and systems
(e.g., the heart, the integumentary system). Feelings are also experienced as representations of
motor tendencies, with anticipated postural and behavioral changes, which also yield spatial
representations.
We thus can conceive of bodily feelings as projective representations of the body in space, in
part or as a whole, undergoing transformations, including representations of the internal state of
the body, ultimately driven by the dynamics of free energy. More specically, these representations
can be driven by (i) ongoing real-time sensorimotor information, (ii) memories, and (iii)
anticipatory imagination. The nature of the relationships between such mental processes and the
gamut of actual physiological processes in the body hic et nunc remains an open question.
At a higher level of integration, the projective workspace can also be thought of as an internal
environment for building, monitoring and housekeeping a self-image in relation to social cognition,
in which the body image as appearing under certain perspectives plays a central role, and is
constantly reappraised in terms of personal relevance [26,105{109].
3 Results
In this section, we apply the PC Model to a variety of behaviors and psychological phenomena. We
begin with the application of a reduced-version of the model, to simulate its basic behavior, and
follow with the analytical application of the full framework to account for a range of perceptual
and cognitive phenomena, including some intractable problems in the philosophy of mind. All the
simulations were prepared using in-house code implemented in Matlab (Mathworks), both for the
reduced-model and for generating 3-dimensional projective spaces and 2-dimensional geometrical
images for illustration of the broader analysis. We used linear algebra and Matlab's opengl
rendering engine for patches based on wireframe meshes, either created by us or freely available
online (e.g., the human model).
3.1 Reduced-computational model
We derived and implemented a simplied version of our model, which included an embodied agent
embedded in a "at land" (2-dimensional plane), with perspective taking and action governed by
free energy minimization. This computational model functions as a basic kernel onto which a full
projective geometry engine operating on a 3-dimensional virtual world (lled with meshes of
objects, avatars and landscapes labeled with personal relevance) will be added in the future. We
apply this simplied model because it preserves essential features of the full model and oers a
general demonstration of its behavior and utility.
It is a reduced model because it is not based on an optimization of 4*4 matrices of projective
transformations, for a fully 3D world. It operates on a simplied model of perspective taking and
projective geometry, adopted for the simulations, in a 2D world. The computation of free energy is
also simplied to that of surprise per se. (The Matlab code implementing these simulations may be
requested to the corresponding author).
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3.1.1 Denition of the model
The world is modeled as a 2-dimensional nite plane (nx ny  k matrix; k standing for the
number of dimensions of personal relevance being encoded as conditional probabilities)(see gure
2a). There is an 'objective' world map F , corresponding to actual expected facts, as sampled by
the agent's sensory interfaces, and a 'subjective' world-map, H corresponding to prior beliefs or
hypotheses about facts stored in memory. Each 2-dimensional location on the maps, with
coordinate X, is associated with two conditional probabilities, related to personal relevance,
encoding safety and pleasure as P (SafetyjH;F ) and P (PleasurejH;F ). These probabilities
represent valenced situations or events that are more or less likely to happen at a given location
and within a given portion of space (e.g., an object, a room), under specic perspectives according
to F or H: 'safe' (S), and 'pleasant' (P ). The two probabilities are independent, as we consider
that the same locations or portions of space can be the support of events with various degrees of S
and P . When the probability of S is low situations are likely to be dangerous, when that of P is,
situations are likely to be unpleasant. (We note that F and H represent a concrete simplication
and unpacking of what we denote generically with X above).
An agent is embodied in the world plane (green dot in gure 2a). Its eld of consciousness
(FoC) is dened as a local compartment of the plane (see box with dashed cross on the charts) with
the agent at the center: this is the world that it can perceive and imagine just around it. A subset
of the FoC is updated based on sensory evidence D across a possible eld of sensation (FoS),
given the actual orientation of the agent in the world map. The complete FoC at each instant is
computed as a linear combination (1) of perceptual evidence, as sampled by the 'current eld of
sensation' (FoS) over the real-world personal relevance map, and (2) of the spatial complement of
the FoS in the FoC, as lled based on the current priors in memory at the corresponding
locations x. The FoC is thus a spatial combination of perceptual evidence and prior beliefs.
gure 2. Reduced-model simulation results. A. The results are organized as a table. Each
row corresponds to a time period in chronological order from top to bottom. Processing modes
alternate between Perception and Imagination (pale blue frame). Real-world personal relevance is
represented by a matrix F and the current prior beliefs in memory by a matrix H. Personal
relevance is color coded from dark blue for "dangerous" (unsafe and unpleasant), through lighter
blue for safe, to pink for pleasant situations. The agent can be located at x within these maps.
The eld of consciousness (FoC) encompasses a subset of the world map centered at x. It is a
linear combination of F as sampled by the eld of sensation (FoS) and H. An intentional vector T
(green arrow) points in the direction of maximum safety and pleasantness according to the
minimization of free energy (FE). B. Left chart: average FE for the whole FoC in red, and the
optimal perspective in green. Right: absolute value of a smoothed version of the rst derivate of
FE, d(FE)=FE, scaled by the current value of FE, as a function of time (number of iterations). C.
Analytics characterizing internal and external parameters of the agent (see text). [Model
parameters: n : 400 (world size, n n matrix); nfoc : 50 (half span in pixel of the FoC); nit : 80
(lifespan: total number of iteration); wEvP : 0:9 (Perception mode: relative weight of local sensory
evidence over prior beliefs in FoS); wEvI : 0:3 (Imagination mode: relative weight of local sensory
evidence over prior beliefs in FoS for local environment tracking); dEthl : 0:01 (Threshold: lower
Value, for the FE derivative statistics controlling the switch between Perception and Imagination);
dEthh : 0:06 (Threshold: higher Value, for the FE derivative statistics. The Imagination mode is
triggered when the dFE statistic cross the lower threshold and stops when it crosses the upper
one.); wlocFoC : 0:4 (Imagination mode: relative weight of local overall FoC in the denition of
the intentional vector); lr : 0:5 ('Learning rate', number of time perceptual evidence weights in the
average H(FoC; t+ 1) = [lr  FoC(F;H; x; t) + FoC(H;x; t)]=(lr + 1)); speed : 7 (Action: agent
nominal speed in number of pixels in the matrix).]. D. Results of simulations for the agent with an
impaired capacity for imagination (see text) [Model parameters: n : 400; nfoc : 50; nit : 80;
wEvP : 0:9; wEvI : 0:3; dEthl : 0:001; dEthh : 0:06; wlocFoC : 0:4; lr : 0:5; speed : 7].
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The agent constantly tries to optimize its eld of consciousness with respect to personal
relevance. It continuously scans its FoC with an attentional beam governed by an 'intentional
vector' T (see gure 2a) over a scope corresponding to a possible eld of sensation (FoS) and
direction of action. The attentional beam is down-weighted as a function of distance to emulate
perspective eects (perspective division). The attentional beam can vary in orientation and eld of
view. The optimization of the parameters of orientation and eld of view is based on the
minimization of average free energy (FE) within the FoC across dierent perspectives (gure 2b).
Free energy is simply approximated in this reduced-model as the negative logarithm of the
conditional probabilities (or surprise) encoding personal relevance. Intentionality is optimized
within a FoC centered at x by selecting the intentional vector, i.e., a perspective T , which
minimizes FE =  log(P (Relevance(FoC(x))jH;F; T )). More specically, the intentional vector is
controlled by the direction and eld of view for which the average free energy is minimal in the
FoC at the current location x. It corresponds to a locally optimal perspective T (green vectors on
the Figs). As a result (gure 2b) the selected perspective has the lowest average FE (green lines in
the gure)(compare with average FE in the overall FoC, red lines in gure 2b). The relative
contribution of H and F in the computation depends on whether the agent operates in a
'Perception-mode' (high-load of sensory information) or in 'Imagination-mode' (high-load of prior
information from memory) (see gure 2a-b). FE is related to motivational drives in the following
way. First, in order to maximize the likelihood of pleasure, the agent's intentional vector will tend
to point towards directions of anticipated maximal pleasure. This implements a mechanism of
'approach' [31]. Second, in order to minimize exposure to danger, the vector will tend to point
towards directions of anticipated maximal safety. This implements a mechanism of 'avoidance'.
The intentional vector is the sum of the two corresponding vectors.
Action is governed by the intentional vector, and position x is updated at each cycle, by
integrating a simple linear dierential equation, based on a unit intentional vector u and a
coecient setting the speed s: x(t+ 1) = x(t) + su. Priors are updated at each cycle, based on the
current FoC. The prior map H is locally averaged with the current FoC in order to reect the
impact of perceptual evidence and conscious experience on beliefs, with a learning rate r that
controls the weight of the current FoC in updating past beliefs in H.
Following the principles dened above, when free energy becomes too stable (rst-derivative
stability analysis), for instance when the agent is not nding any location around its current
location that clearly improves its situation, i.e., further minimizes free energy, the agent enters into
a 'pure Imagination mode' (a form of active mind-wandering), during which it scans its memory
(its current prior map) in order to identify locations X 0 beyond its current FoC, at which free
energy could be further of more eciently minimized. The switch between cycles of
perception-action and imagination is dened by upper and lower thresholds bounding a smoothed
version of the normalised derivative of FE: d(FE)=FE. The imagination mode is triggered when
the lower threshold is crossed and turned o when the upper threshold is crossed. Imagination
consists of the access to priors in memory via the generation of a FoC which is based on the prior
map H versus fact map F , according to a set relative weight (even during imagination,
consciousness normally keeps track of its local environment). The imaginary FoC map that
minimizes FE is selected (model selection) as a desired destination, and weights in the denition of
the intentional vector.
During the Imagination mode, imagination tends to drive action. The intentional vector is
dened based on the most desirable location x0 provided through a process of active
"mind-wandering". The same equation that governs the Perception mode is integrated to actualize
the motion, with a set speed parameter.
3.1.2 Simulation results
gure 2 illustrates the simulation results. At T1 (gure 2a), the agent starts stuck in an
environment which appears worse than expected as it updates its prior map, and wanders around
in circles without nding a more optimal outcome from the standpoint of its local FoC. Free
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energy is high (gure 2b), and stable. The green arrow on the left chart of gure 2b indicates the
dierence in average free energy content between the selected local optimal perspective T and the
overall FoC. In other words, the agent has no "hope" in the local area it has been sampling
through its FoC. At T2, the agent starts imagining itself at a location at which FE is minimal (red
arrow) according to its prior map in memory, and thus which maximizes the likelihood of
pleasantness and safety. The agent proceeds to move towards this location. At T3, the agent is
shown arriving at a location that does not exactly match its prior beliefs about personal relevance.
According to its current FoC, the location is rather safe but not particularly pleasant. Free energy
is lower than before but remains relatively high accordingly (see plateau between the two bursts of
imagination indicated by red arrows in gure 2b). The situation is better but far from optimal. As
the agent explores the local area, it updates its prior beliefs to better reect reality (F ) based on
the sampling of the world-map via its current FoS. At T4, the agent nds itself stuck in the safe
but anhedonic area. The lack of change in FE, irrespective of the perspective being taken, triggers
again the agent's imagination mode. The optimal imaginary FoC is now found by imaginary
projection in a location with high probability of safety and pleasantness. FE relaxes and drops by
anticipation (red arrow), oering a new 'hope' for the agent's FoC optimization. The agent starts
its journey towards this new destination. The imagined location happens to fall outside the actual
location of the area of pleasantness on the world map (see F versus H maps in gure 2a). But it
happens to be near it. When the agent arrives at the projected location (T5), the actual area of
maximum likelihood of pleasantness and safety begins to enter in its FoC through its FoS, and, in
the process of minimizing free energy, the agent moves in this direction. At T6, the agent has now
found a broadly optimal solution to the problem of minimization of FE, and remains stuck in it,
enjoying its own FoC, without further optimization in perspective. FE is low and there is no local
path to an even lower FE. After a while, the agent which is 'bored' (the rst derivativebecomes
stable again FE), starts to imagine other options. But because it derives its non-local inferences
entirely based on its prior map H during Imagination-mode, and because that current prior map
does not show any better areas outside the current area covered by its FoC, the agent goes back
and forth locally, oscillating between Perception-mode and Imagination-mode, with its
observations globally matching its expectations: it is globally satised. Its world-model in memory
is now much closer to the actual world-map, but it still carries biases, which make the agent blind
to potentially better areas and, as a result, unmotivated to further travel to remote locations, in
the absence of any internal or external changes.
gure 2c, shows a set of analytics from the agent. The middle chart displays (colored lines)
cumulative average frequencies of dierent categories of perceived (continuous lines) versus
imagined (dashed lines) situations in the FoC as a function of time, corresponding to the
proportion of time spent experiencing: pleasantness (red lines), safety (blue lines), and overall
utility (green lines), which were calculated as the average of the cumulative frequencies of
pleasantness and safety. Overall, the agent optimizes utility: starting from a bad spot, it rst
experiences a decreasing sense of safety, and as it imagines a better non-local outcome experiences
by anticipation an increasing amount of safety and pleasantness. Imagination as a projective
solution to the problem of local minima helps the agent to climb the gradient of utility, and thus
renders it more resilient. Because the agent learns by progressively updating its prior beliefs, its
representation of the world in memory also progressively becomes more accurate as it explores the
world (black line in the middle chart, which shows the correlation coecient or predictive power
between the prior map H and the world fact map F ). The top chart shows the dierence in
cumulative frequency for overall utility between perception and imagination or the agent's level of
"optimism". The agent starts with a phase of disillusionment, followed by a phase of optimism,
progressively converging toward a balanced state of realism (the expectations of the agent better
reect the world). The bottom chart shows in color (from dark blue for low values, through green,
to dark red for high values), the cumulative frequency of three parameters related to covert and
overt activity: (1) the angle of the attentional beam, (2) the quantity of rotation of the intentional
vector, and (3) the amount of actual displacement. The agent's overall activity decreases as it
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optimizes its FoC climbing the gradient of personal relevance, and its attentional beam tends to
become narrower. gure 2d shows the results of another simulation with identical initial conditions,
the same agent, except for a lower value of the threshold controlling the triggering of the
imagination mode as a function of the dynamics of the rst derivative of FE. The agent has a
dramatically impaired ability to rely upon non-local projective imagination, e.g., third-person
perspective, and only experiences the world through a local FoC, e.g., rst-person perspective. As
a result, its exploration of the world is much more limited (see maps at T6). FE minimization
follows a slower and smoother optimization. The level of FE remains high and sub-optimal at the
end of the agent's journey, where it nds safety but not pleasantness, by mere proximity. The
charts showing the agent's analytics (next to the corresponding chart for the rst agent in gure 2)
indicate bad performance in optimization of utility, with amelioration in experienced safety, but
barely any pleasantness experienced. The accuracy of the agent's representation of the world is
also lower. The agent displays little optimism. The lack of imagination has rendered the agent less
resilient.
These simulation results demonstrate the suitability and functioning of the general
mathematical instantiation of the PC Model. We now concentrate on applications to more specic
psychological phenomena, which we explain by reasoning based on the full model.
3.2 The puzzle of the missing origin
According to the phenomenological postulates, consciousness seems to embed a vantage point that
is elusively connected to the center of lived space and plays a generative role in shaping lived space.
The elusiveness of this vantage point is predicted by the PCM model. It follows from an integral,
denitional property of a projective space. colorred We saw that a denition of the n dimensional
projective space Pn can be obtained from a linear space eV of dimension n+ 1, by considering all
the straight lines from the origin O. This can be understood as an embedding of the space Pn in
the space Pn+1, with an additional general point of view in the supplementary dimension. The
central point from which the projection is set up must be excluded from the projection to generate
a projective space. By analogy let us consider the case of a projection on a 2-dimensional plane as
in perspective painting or photography: to project 3-dimensional objects in Euclidean ambient
space onto a canvas or lm so that they appear in perspective, a center of projection or focal point
has to be chosen outside of the plane of projection in ambient 3-dimensional space, otherwise all
the objects would be projected onto the same point on the 2-dimensional plane that serves for
representation. In other words, 2-dimensional images are really understood as 3-dimensional
objects, with an elusive origin residing in a supplementary, implicit third dimension, which is
necessary to set up a projection. This property generalizes to projective spaces of higher dimension
such as 3-dimensional projective spaces like our lived space: to project 3-dimensional objects from
a certain projective space (outside or in memory) in our projective space of 3 dimensions, a center
of projection or focal point has to be chosen outside that space in a 4-dimensional space, which in
practice requires the use of homogeneous coordinates in order to make the points in 3-dimensional
ambient space correspond to 4-dimensional objects. Note the important theorem [110] asserting
that the full projective group of a projective space of dimension n can be obtained by composing
perspectives in a projective space of dimension (n+ 1). Consequently, the embedding of our 3D
space in the 4D space allows us to generate projective changes of frames, as they are used in
imagination, using perspectives from imagined points outside of the world.
In other words, the 3-dimensional lived space can be embedded in a 4-dimensional projective
setup, with an elusive origin residing in a supplementary, implicit 4th (vector) dimension, allowing
the projective group to act as changes of points of view.
Nevertheless, this extra-dimension is not mysterious. It is a parametric dimension, which
controls perspective taking by conguring the direction, scope and perspective of the projection.
In the numerical model, it is expressed in the use of 4 4 transformation matrices T (applied on
homogeneous coordinates). The extra dimension with the excluded origin is essential in dening
and generating the projection. It is fully computable but it does not have a direct geometrical (or
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subjective) manifestation in the 3-dimensional space. In 3-dimensional lived space, this extra
dimension remains inaccessible. This means that according to our model, imagination as applied to
the phenomenological 3-dimensional world, is generated from elements of a perception spectrum
residing in a higher-dimension that cannot be directly grasped through a 3-dimensional
representation of space.
3.3 Bistable illusions from ambiguous planar gures
The PCM can account for bistable visual illusions such as the ubiquitous Necker cube. Planar
projection of objects in spaces or "images" tend to be decoded by the brain as representations of
3-dimensional objects from a given standpoint and interpreted as such in perception [111]. In other
words, in such contexts, using our model, somehow perception always engages a situated form of
imagination: it extrudes depth information as it renders images in consciousness, but it remains
driven by sensory data so it appears as a perception. The Necker cube illusion consists of the
3-dimensional illusion of a cube switching orientation, which is elicited by a visual confrontation
with a 2-dimensional ambiguous gure (see gure 3-a). The ambiguous gure can be interpreted as
the planar orthographic (ane Euclidean) projection I of the edges of a generic cube R (serving as
model prototype in memory) on an image plane. The projection is ambiguous: two dierent
orientations, R1 and R2, of the cube in ambient space can have identical orthographic projections
I1 and I2 on the image plane. In the experiment, the projections on the retinas of such ambiguous
image plane provide sensory inputs D to the brain.
Based on the PCM, such an ambiguity would challenge any attempt by the active inference
engine to solve the inverse problem of ecologically interpreting sensory inputs D as a likely generic
cube R in 3-dimensional space with a given orientation.
Studies of the illusion have emphasized local rules for controlling the switch of the Necker cube
(e.g., Homan's rule), and have considered the problem in relation to the "generic viewpoint
assumption", which implies that there is no a priori viewpoint position dened in such images but
that a viewpoint is nevertheless assumed in interpreting it [112]. In this framework, the bistability
of the illusion induced by the ambiguity has received a Bayesian formulation [112]. Our model
complements this approach by specifying the projective geometrical underpinning of the
phenomenon.
Solving the underlying inverse problem involves perspective taking: a projective transformation
T that best ts the implied orientation must be selected to represent the cube in projective space.
Unless strong priors are given about the object being of type cube R from the outset, in general,
the selection of R as a cube is also part of the process of inference. In our framework, this
corresponds to maximizing the posterior probability P (T;RjD) = P (DjT;R)P (T;R)P (D) of the
transformation T and of R, as a generic cube and internal model in memory, given D from sensory
information. If for an optimal selection of R the maximum of P(T,R|D) was unique, i.e., there
would be a unique T maximizing the quantity, and conscious access could be computed in a stable
manner as (the prediction) S = T R, which is the generic equation of the rendering of a cube in
perspective with a genuine sense of depth and a given orientation in a projective space.
In the normal perception of a real cube in ambient space, extraction of color and shade
information, but also perspective eects and binocular disparity related to depth, would constrain
the inverse problem. The two viewpoints would not have an equivalent posterior probability (i.e.,
there would be a unique optimal solution to the problem of selecting T ) . With a real wireframe
cube presented at nite distance and projected on a 2-dimensional image plane, perspective and
binocular disparity eects would remain to constrain the inference (e.g., the front side would
appear bigger than the back side on retinal images, and there would be dierent angles of
projection) (gure 3-a, left-tier). With the Necker cube's implicit orthographic projection on a
2-dimensional image plane, there are no perspective cues, and there is no binocular disparity
(gure 3-a, right-tier). The transformations T1 and T2 that correspond to R1 and R2 respectively,
i.e., the cube under the dierent possible viewpoints, have the same posterior probability and thus
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the same level of free energy (FE).
gure 3. Account of psychological phenomena. A. projective solutions to the Necker
cube. Projection of two complementary views S1 and S2 of a generic wireframe cube R in a
projective space (rendered on an image plane). Left: The point of view is located near the
projected cube in ambient space: perspective information helps to disambiguate the inference
about the two possible orientations of the cube, T1 and T2 (see gray ellipses indicating the front).
As a result, free energy (FE) always possesses a minimum for a unique transformation T and
perception can stabilize. Right: The point of view is placed far away but seen with a strong zoom.
No perspective information remains to disambiguate the orientation of the cube. Free energy does
not possess a unique minimum, each option is unsatisfying, the inference is globally undecidable
but irrepressible, and the system can only oscillate between the two possible outcomes. B.
Projective solution to VR-mediated dissociations in phenomenal selfhood. The visual
eld is indicated (dashed-green line) as a subset of lived space. Left: Projection from the normal
perception spectrum: S1 = T
P R, the projective frame is calibrated in Perception-mode. Right:
Projection from the pure imagination subgroup: S2 = T
I R. Because of the experimental
conditions, a projective solution that is not normally used for perception will be chosen as the best
explanation of sensory data. C. The anti-space beyond the plane at innity. Rendering of
the projective space with a transparent plane at innity and no clipping, revealing the involution
of the space mirroring the back of the ambient space (see text). D. The "God's eye" vantage
point on the projective space. Rendering on a 2-dimensional image-plane of the projective
space and its mapping of the world model (used in (b) and (c)), from the "God's eye" point of
view at innity. Almost all the space is visible but completely warped and the world model
manifests as structures with complex symmetries.
Moreover, in the group of projective transformations, the only transformations that are
compatible with the absence of both perspective cues and binocular disparity entail an implicit
point of view placed at a very far distance from the object, near projective innity T (1), with a
small viewing angle so that the far distant object (the cube) appears big enough in the scope of the
projection. For instance, observing very far objects with powerful binoculars results in their
perspective cues vanishing and there is barely any binocular disparity. On the contrary, observing
objects from up close increases perspective cues and binocular disparity. In perspective painting,
the implicit point of view (center of projection) is generally close to the main group of objects, and
the wide angles used for close-ups in photography magnify perspective eects. Points of view
placing objects near projective innity (or equivalently points of view placed near projective
innity) correspond to a subspace of the possible congurations of a projective space, which is
equivalent to a space of orthographic projection. Near projective innity, the 3-dimensional
projections of the two alternate orientations of the cube "look" identical and thus remain totally
ambiguous. There is nothing in conscious access allowing the agent to further disambiguate the
information and privilege one orientation over the other.
However, placing the point of view near an innite distance from the object in order to explain
the absence of perspective cues and depth disparity in D directly conicts with ongoing
information about the actual distance of the object in ambient space in the experiment, e.g., just
in front on a computer screen.
By the end, (i) with no unique maximum in the posterior probability of competing
transformations T , and (ii) conicting priors about relative distances, the inverse inference is
maximally ambiguous and, outside of a metacognitively imposed voluntary control exerted on
higher-order attention, the active inference engine can only oscillate between bistable percepts,
with no help from conscious access to stabilize the representation.
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3.4 Proprioceptive illusions and out-of-body experiences
Clinical and experimental situations can elicit experiential dissociations between the sense of the
location of the subjective point of view and the perceived location of the body in ambient space,
e.g., OBEs, syndromes of somatoparaphrenia, anarchic hands and phantom limbs, the rubber hand
illusion, enfacement or full-body illusions [14,55]. In OBEs, subjects hallucinate their own body
from a third-person perspective, e.g., as a phantom body above them, or travelling away [113].
VR-based manipulations have facilitated reliable elicitation of full body swap illusions in the
laboratory, which are analogous to OBEs [14,47,55]. For instance, when a participant and a
humanoid virtual avatar are being stroked simultaneously, an embodied illusion of spatial
identication with the virtual avatar, for instance projected in front of the actual participant, is
experienced. The location of the body feels both near the point of view and at the avatar's
location. Likewise, Ehrsson [114] placed cameras behind the backs of participants and projected
the image of the body of the participants in front using a VR device. This suced to induce a
subjective impression in the participants of being literally seated behind their own backs and
looking at themselves from this location [115{117].
Such dissociations between the subjective locations of the point of view and of the body in
space are predicted and can be explained by our model. Base on the PCM, the body as
experienced is accessed in consciousness in a projective way, like a multisensory-informed virtual
body avatar. In normal perception, the projective body is rendered from an egocentric, rst-person
vantage point, as an object in space, which serves as a central reference to which the implicit point
of view is attached. Only a subset of generalized, degenerate projective transformations T p, the
perception spectrum, will be assumed as priors for spatial inference and perspective taking in order
to access the body representation projectively as S(B) = T p B.
In VR paradigms inducing the perceptual experience of sitting behind one's own back [114] or
similar phenomena of body swapping [47], multimodal sensory data D are conicting (e.g., visual
and somatosensory) in relation to the perspective normally assumed in perception. They are
evidence for models of perspective taking, i.e., projective transformations T I , that normally are
only associated with pure imagination, e.g., in which the representation of the body is accessed
from a third-person perspective. These transformations by no means require an actual
displacement of the person in real space: they are a parameterization of the transformation
matrices through which the representation of the body is accessed in consciousness, through
perspective taking (see gure 3-b).
In such VR paradigms, the process of spatial inference is challenged. Perceptual
transformations TP are expected, i.e., the prior P (TP ) is high, because the process remains driven
by sensory data D. But the conditional probability of the data P (DjT;R) is maximal for a specic
transformation T I that belongs to the full group of invertible projective transformations, which is
normally dedicated to imagination in our model. In such ecologically abnormal situations, the best
bet for the agent is to use transformations T I to explain sensory data D. The predictive power of
the solution outweighs the priors of normal perceptual transformations. What would normally be
only a possibility for the imagination thus manifests as perception, since the inference remains
driven by sensory data D. The boundary between imagination-related and perception-related
modes of conscious access is shifted in this highly unusual context.
3.5 Self-representation and pre-reective self-consciousness
3.5.1 Self-representation as awareness of the workspace itself
A model of consciousness should be able to account for the central yet puzzling capacity of
consciousness to somehow be aware of itself. This capacity for self-representation or
self-acquaintance is an intense topic of debate in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
science [?, 5, 51,57,118].
Maintaining a certain neutrality about many contested issues here (e.g., the exact nature of the
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representation or acquaintance involved), we approach the problem starting from our denition of
consciousness as a workspace with a characteristic spatial phenomenology based on projective
geometry. In this context, consciousness represents world structures and itself in a spatial manner.
Full self-representation for that model of consciousness could mean the ability to represent the
entire space of representation itself, including the point of view.
When the point of view is placed near innite distance from its target and the eld of view is
maximal, much of the space appears wrapped into the scope of the projection (see below). The
entirety of the generative space cannot however be fully encompassed in this scope, since the origin
of the space and the parametric extra dimension will always remain elusive.
Conversely, when the point of view is taken from somewhere near us, a kind of imaginary
cyclopean eye, the world is roughly divided in two parts: the world at nite distance (itself divided
in body space, prehension space and near locomotion space, [11]), and the innitely far world,
where we can only imagine things happening, but out of the scope of our own actions.
Nevertheless, consciously, we can relate these things that are projected on the plane at innity.
This ability is consistent with the existence of natural projective metrics, in which all distances are
nite, and in which the plane at innity corresponds to the set of points at maximal distance from
the center of vision.
3.5.2 The anti-space and Pre-reective self-awareness
Nevertheless, projective spaces embed further features of genuine self-representation that are
remarkable. The mechanism of perspective taking denes a vantage point and a plane at innity,
and the complement of these elements (the represented world) in the generated space has the
structure of a 3-dimensional ane space (on which a Euclidean metric can be dened). This
geometry is non-trivial. Considering a large sphere, with a given xed center (the standpoint) and
a very large radius that tends to innity (the possible horizon of consciousness), antipodal points
on this sphere project to the same point at projective innity in the projective space: the space is
folded onto itself through the topological gluing of antipodal points. Thus, paradoxically, the back
of the ambient or modeled space with respect to the vantage point (be it empty or informed with a
representation of a world R from memory), is actually projected in front, but on the other side of
the innity plane, similar to a 3-dimensional virtual mirror image. This "antispace" is usually
clipped in digital imaging.
Such strange projective property of involution of the space could not manifest in normal
perception because the projective space is practically clipped from residual projections in the
compartment beyond the horizon: in perception, the celestial sphere saturates the horizon with
perceptual information, and world boundaries in the nite compartment of the space (e.g., walls)
will tend to mask it. Moreover, one can expect that for computational eciency, the parts of the
world representation R mapped in memory that are behind the vantage point and outside the
scope of the perspective do not generally need to be processed for normal conscious access. They
can be ignored by attentional selection, prior to projective inference.
Nevertheless, such a symmetric mapping does exist and is always dened in projective spaces
no matter which structures from R ll it, and it is mirrored in the very scope of the projection
beyond the plane at innity, and could thus perhaps be explicitly observed if the horizon could be
somewhat rendered less opaque. Thus, geometrically, unbeknownst to us, in the projective space of
our consciousness, in perception, imagination and action programming, one also always aims at
one's own back, at an "anti-space", when one aims frontward at the horizon (see gure 3-c).
In our framework, this can be interpreted as one way in which consciousness is always tacitly
aware of itself prior to any explicit reection. Geometrically, the vanishing point I am aiming at,
the horizon of my conscious space at positive innity in front, is also the projection of the back of
the antipodal point that is located behind me at negative innity. My implicit vantage point is
paradoxically located "between" the same unique ideal point at innity, which seem at the same
time to be two points along opposite directions. Although these statements may appear
contradictory they are mathematically well dened in projective geometry, consistent and fully
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computable, and the behavior of the space in the nite compartment respects usual relations of
orientation and incidence. Thus, according to the model, there is a projective machinery that is
dened but remains normally hidden. The way it works as a projection does not imply that an
explicit curvature will be apparent in such "elliptical" spaces.
In the variegated and multi-disciplinary literature on self-representation, the concept of
"pre-reective" self-consciousness has become an important subtopic of debate [4, 5, 119{121]. The
idea that consciousness always involves a form of pre-reective self-consciousness is the hypothesis
that there is a genuine reexive (versus reective) form of self-consciousness that (i) does not
require a distinct, higher-order mapping or meta-representation S2 (a representation of a
representation) of subjective consciousness S1 at the rst-order, (ii) is truly embedded in the space
of awareness itself, as elusive as it may be, and (iii) is a necessary basis for higher-order, reective
self-awareness. Interpreted variously, the notion has been criticized for being unanalyzable,
ill-dened, or circular, whereas some, on the contrary, emphasize the importance of nding models
that could incorporate such circularity without generating paradoxes [4, 5].
We suggest that the peculiar topological properties of projective geometry could perhaps make
sense of the hypothesis of a pre-reective consciousness, in a more formal way. This is at least one
way in which a pre-reective form of self-awareness can be built into the architecture of
consciousness, and it is an intrinsic feature of our model.
3.5.3 Gaze behavior in mind wandering
Beyond its general role in shaping imagination under the driving of personal relevance, this
peculiar geometry might also further illuminate the phenomenon of mind wandering. Mind
wandering and daydreaming are directly linked to increased self-referential processing and
self-consciousness [66]. When our mind wanders it tends to turn toward self-related inner concerns
away from external information processing [122] and to generate projective scenarios about the
past, the present, and the future [66]. Attention is withdrawn from outside events, we are less
sensitive to sensory data, and we may appear to others as phasing out or being distant. Our eyes
seem to look through the vacuum to the external observer; that is, we lose binocular xation on
the proximal environment, and eye movements can become erratic [123]. In other words, we seem
to weight down the processing of multisensory data D and weight up that of information from
memory and internal simulations on the R being accessed, increasing, according to our model,
imagination (about past, present and future events) over ongoing perception. Interpreted from a
geometrical standpoint, the overt gaze behavior may suggest that we tend to enter into divergent
parallel binocular states during self-referential processing. Interpreted as an index of a projective
parameterization of a perspective on an imaginary space, divergent parallel binocular states imply
underlying projective transformations T that aim at or from innity. Although this remains
speculative and should be addressed experimentally in the future, our model would predict that, in
such aiming, the subject may also be aiming at the anti-space, i.e., at her or his own back. Under
such perspectives, a subjective perspective on the entire space might be approximated, in a manner
that is consistent with an activity of self-representation.
3.5.4 Mystical and psychedelic experiences
Various spiritual practices (e.g., meditation), the use of hallucinogenic drugs (e.g., mescaline),
extreme life experiences (e.g., near death experiences), dreams, phenomena of entoptic vision
induced by ocular pressure, and clinical conditions have been associated with reported subjective
experiences of strange and fascinating spatial patterns in consciousness: radial patterns, spirals,
funnels, cobwebs, honeycomb lattices and triangles, deep tunnels, which have then been a topic of
artistic representation in many cultures (e.g., mandalas) [124{128]. Such patterns have been
hypothesized to reect the inner structure of spatial consciousness as a level of representation and
a mode of access to information [126], as cited in [127]. We can wonder whether our model can
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predict similar patterns, as would be expected from a valid model of consciousness, given their
importance in human experience.
Projective spaces and transformations can lead to peculiar perspectives on the structure of the
space, in particular when the implicit standpoint is placed at near innite distance from the center
of the world in the scope of the projection (which is a parameter to set in the corresponding
transformation matrix). This is, so to speak, the "God's eye" point of view. From this standpoint
almost the entire space of representation manifests in the scope of the projection. As a result,
symmetries and strange topological patterns may appear, which are reminiscent of the type of
aforementioned patterns (see gure 3-d). We hypothesize that such psychological phenomena are a
reection of the application of "limit" projective transformations (e.g., placing the point of view
near innity), generally in a context of extreme conditions, in which the mind moves away from
the normal constraints of perception and uses the imagination group widely to solve the inverse
problem of representing a spatial world in a projective manner from a stream of sensory and
mnemonic information. We may wonder whether such a projective setup, with its intrinsic
dissociation between the subjective standpoint and the apparent location of the body in space,
could be a natural ground for the emergence of beliefs in various metaphysical forms of
dualism [129].
4 Discussion
We derived a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness Model
(PCM), based on projective geometry and active inference, which features a characteristic mode of
representation of space or spatial phenomenology, resulting from a mechanism of conscious access
based on perspective taking, and which operates based on the minimization of free energy as
related to a probabilistic eld encoding cognitive and aective personal relevancies mapped across
space. The model: (i) yields basic behaviors that are predicted by the theory and
phenomenologically sound, and accounts for a variety of cognitive phenomena that have not been
linked previously in a unifying manner, (ii) predicts core aspects of the characteristic
phenomenology itself, and (iii) renders explicit the link between phenomenological features and
their functional and computational value as a specic mode of access to information and a support
for the driving of action in the context of situated cognition.
The PCM directly connects consciousness, active inference and appraisal to resilience, in line
with previous hypotheses [1, 39]. So far no model had been introduced, which was both fully
computationally tractable, and integrated a comprehensive model of cognition and aective
processing in embodied ecosystems, including a model of the rst-person or experiential
perspective. The development and implementation of mechanistic models of cognitive and
emotional resilience are essential in order to precisely understand, in a predictive manner, the
mechanisms mediating resilience, in the perspective of preventive and acute healthcare.
4.1 Neurocomputational hypotheses
The computational architecture implied by our model can be translated into general
neurocomputational hypotheses, in accordance with the principles of neurophenomenology [8, 130].
We have argued that such and integrative processes of conscious representation and control may
rely on a form of virtualization in the brain, integrating information processing through layers of
abstraction into a global, resilient predictive world model [1].
In this framework, we expect the relationships between the PCM algorithm and the functioning
of neural networks, in particular at the microscale, to be complex and indirect. On a general note,
assuming that the brain uses a projective geometry as part of its generative model is agnostic with
regard to the particular neuronal encoding. For example, positions and metrics could be encoded
as continuous variables in neuronal population activity. Conversely, there could be a discrete state
space model of the sort suggested by classical receptive elds (with compact support). Irrespective
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of the particular encoding, our point is that there must be a formal connectivity among neuronal
populations encoding allowable transformations that mediate belief updating among neuronal
representations (see for instance recent hypotheses about neural computation referring to
topological theorems that are also intrinsic to projective geometry [131]).
In terms of the functional architectures that the projective geometry model calls for, there is an
abundance of empirical evidence implicating specic brain systems. On this basis, the model
predicts that the brain should embed two main engines that are hierarchically coupled (gure 4):
(i) an inference engine grouping higher levels of control concerned with homeostasis, emotion,
memory, language and executive functions, or more generally personal relevance; and (ii) a lower
(sensorimotor) projective geometry engine, relying on multisensory integration and motor
programming and concerned with representing the world and the body in the world and mapping
gradients of free energy to drive intentionality. Active inference provides the overall hierarchical
infrastructure and various message-passing schemes required for generating predictions and
inferring the world (R), adaptive transformations (T ).
gure 4. Macroscale neurocomputational model Lateral aspect of the right hemisphere of
a brain model. The projective geometry engine is implemented in posterior cortical and subcortical
systems (gray blue). The framing and rendering of the subjective experience of space through
perspective taking is performed by those systems, which apply projective transformations such
that S = T R. The active inference engine is implemented in anterior limbic and non-limbic
cortical and subcortical systems (red). It integrates memory (including world-representations R
stored in mesiotemporal systems), aective processing of personal relevance (the amygdala and
ventral prefrontal cortex), and executive components (the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia).
The cerebellum (bright blue), along with the basal ganglia, perform an ongoing sensorimotor
calibration, relating the projective space to the Euclidean space of action E. All the systems are
coupled and interact through large-scale connectivity and networks (color arrows).
From an anatomical standpoint, we hypothesize that the inference engine relies on anterior
cortical and subcortical systems, including limbic and non-limbic frontal and temporal association
cortices, the amygdala and hippocampus. The projective geometry engine can be hypothesized to
rely on posterior temporal-parietal-occipital, modal and multimodal sensory systems, in particular
in parietal systems, encompassing exteroceptive, proprioceptive (including vestibular) and
interoceptive processing, but also on frontal premotor regions. Recent evidence supports the
existence of a partition of the cerebral cortex into two main anterior and posterior functional
ensembles, in a manner that is compatible with our hypothesis of a posterior real-time projective
geometry engine and of a slower anterior hierarchical active inference engine quantifying personal
relevance [132].
The tight relationship between spatial memory and aective processing in the brain, as
mediated by the interactions between the hippocampus and amygdala, is in general support of a
model of space in memory imbued with personal relevance: the strong interactions between the
hippocampus and the amygdala and other limbic structures are thought to play a role in the
labeling of memory of spatial locations with personal relevance [31,37]. A large body of literature
implicates the hippocampus in spatial representations and scene construction; ranging from place
cells through to sequential navigations through metric spaces [133{135]. The para-hippocampal
system would then be expected (in our model) to play a key role in the representation R that is
stored in memory and that is accessed in consciousness through projective transformations in the
recall of scenes. Likewise, the strong interactions between the (DMN) and medial temporal systems
in the context of autobiographical memory recall [136] can be understood in the PCM framework as
related to the process of addressing R and its labeling in terms of personal relevance in the model.
The construction and application of projective transformation T to both sensory data D and
data from memory R are presumed to call on parietal processing. For example, the distinction
between what and where pathways in the brain [137,138] tells us immediately that a vast amount
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of the visual hierarchy (the dorsal stream, which includes much of the parietal cortex) is devoted to
spatial transformations. This observation is endorsed by spatial neglect syndromes following
damage to the parietal cortex [139,140]. Furthermore, mental rotation tasks [141] and scene
construction tasks [142] almost universally engage parietal cortex, including the precuneus and
retrosplenial cortex. Work looking at saccadic eye control (perhaps the most obvious manifestation
of spatial transformations) and sensorimotor transformations in motor planning implicates regions
like the intraparietal sulcus [143].
At a more global scale, we expect frontal-parietal-temporal interactions to be related to
inference and perspective taking via the adaptive selection and application of projective
transformations to spatial models in memory as a function of personal relevance. Conscious-access
across cycles of inference requires addressing information related to R in memory or to D in
multisensory systems in an adaptive and well-scheduled way based on such transformations.
Switching between these two perceptual and imaginary modes of access may be expected to be
supported by medial and lateral fronto-parietal networks. There is an ongoing debate in the
cognitive neuroscience of consciousness as to whether conscious access and experience require
fronto-parietal interactions or only coherent activity in posterior cortices [18, 19]. We believe that
this debate might be in part driven by a focus on dierent aspects of consciousness that may end
up corresponding to the dierent hierarchical levels implicit in our model and its division into two
main engines.
At a lower level of integration, the brainstem, thalamus, reticular nucleus of the thalamus, the
precuneus and related regions can also expected to play a role in the arbitration or switch between
dierent projective modes (e.g., "Perception-mode" versus "Imagination-mode"), and in a form of
arousal related to free energy. These brain systems can be expected to modulate, notably through
mono-aminergic transmission, the precision or weight allocated to sensory data D in the process of
projective inference, and are key modulators of vigilance states. The cerebellum as well as the
basal ganglia are expected to play a key role in the calibration of the dierent subspaces and
transformations between them (e.g., between S the projective space of conscious access based on
perspective taking, the Euclidean representations of knowledge in memory R, which is independent
from any point of observation, the associated eld of personal relevance, and the compilation of
predicted action into a space of eectors with biomechanical constraints, gure 4).
4.2 Real-world applications: implications for system design and
autonomous computational agents
Beyond the scientic and theoretical value of a computational model of embodied consciousness,
our approach has a strong potential for real-world impact. We argue that the emerging set of
interrelated elds that include autonomous computational agents, robotics, and articial
intelligence (AI), as well as new developments in virtual reality (VR) applications, can benet
signicantly from the development of a mathematical model of embodied consciousness. The PC
Model contributes by specifying what parts of consciousness (beyond intrinsic biological properties)
could be transferred into an AI environment and the principles by which these components will
function and become integrated. The model also provides specic predictions for how embodied AI
agents will behave and an explanatory framework by which these predictions can be interpreted in
human terms. This latter advantage is no small contribution: it has become increasingly clear that
one of the most pressing problems with the application of advanced AI systems is their ultimate
inscrutability [144].
Some of the principles at the center of our model are actually already heavily used, in bits and
pieces, in industry: in ltering and image processing, in cybernetics and robotics, in cinema (CGI),
in virtual and augmented reality. Our model, which can be interpreted as a formal theory of
"enaction" and embodiment, though without the externalist implications normally associated with
these approaches, see [8], integrates these principles into a coherent whole that oers the sketch of
a design for embodied consciousness in articial systems.
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4.3 Real-world applications: consciousness and Virtual Reality
If the PCM is correct, consciousness accesses multisensory information D by framing it as a
representation of space in a 3-dimensional projective space, supported by prior beliefs about the
3-dimensional structure of the space to be represented and about the forward models governing
sensory processing. In this context, the framing of spatial consciousness by projective geometry
may explain why it can make sense of 2-dimensional projections such as images and lms from
multiple standpoints, and why Virtual Reality (VR) can be so eective at inducing an immersive
feeling of realistic presence in a 3-dimensional world.
The PCM predicts that congurations of inputs provided to sensory interfaces (i.e., a projection
of a geometrical model of a virtual world or of the real world on the sensory interfaces) will be
interpreted and framed in consciousness as the experience of a world of 3-dimensional objects in
perspective. In VR, the world represented, just as with normal perception, will be based on an
inverse projection inferring the causes of the sensory inputs and implicating an operation of
perspective taking. If the virtual world is simulated in a realistic manner, this simulated world is
expected to appear to consciousness with a sense of direct realism, that is with a sense of natural
evidence, similar to that of normal perception.
VR immerses participants in an articial sensorimotor environment that takes cybernetic
control of the interfacing of the conscious workspace with sensory inputs and motor outputs [145].
Through metacognitive processing, we may well understand that cognition is immersed in a
counter-factual virtual world, nevertheless the brain interprets the inputs and the consequences of
the outputs on them, at a sensorimotor level, in an embodied and aective manner, as it would
with the real physical world. Consciousness cannot help but access this information as it would for
normal perception, since it is structured to be processed accordingly. The generation of the stimuli
used for VR-devices (e.g., Head Mounted Display; HMD), is based on the application of projective
geometry (and projective transformations) to 3-dimensional geometrical models of dynamical
structures in Euclidean space, in a manner that takes into account the real-time position and
orientation of the HMD for perspective taking. Sounds are also presented through headphones
according to geometrical and physical transformations to account for the localization of their
sources in the world model. A persistent problem with VR experiences for decades has been the
ubiquitous feelings of motion sickness and nausea. VR fails to be immersive and to induce a rich,
natural sense of presence in another world, when the sensorimotor contingencies, the
responsiveness of the VR devices to motion (HMD, audio headset, controllers tracked in space),
and the sense of agency and the accurate control of intentionality and action, are limited by the
technological setup. In other words, immersive presence is only achieved when the setup can
awlessly simulate the input-output relationships and parameters that condition the type of
perspective taking embedded in the PCM.
In turn, because its geometrical properties are so in tune with the generative mechanisms of
consciousness we put forth, VR appears as an exceptionally promising tool for studying
consciousness. The application of such VR paradigms in the context of paradigms of sensory
conict can reliably induce numerous states of bodily awareness in which phenomenal selfhood
parameters can be manipulated at a sensorimotor level independently, from: (i) the
self-identication with a body as whole; (ii) the self-location relative to the lived body; and (iii)
the framing in rst-person versus third-person perspectives [14, 47,55]. We demonstrated above
how the PCM can account for such illusions and phenomenal dissociations, and how it can make
sense of their paradoxical emergence in the context of non-ecological VR-mediated experimental
manipulations. VR could be further used to test hypotheses about real, normal and pathological
human behavior based on direct predictions of the PCM as a function of its parameters, These
types of manipulations in VR environments would oer experimental paradigms, based on formal
mathematical principles, to quantitatively study processes such as optimal decision-making under
stress as well as the structure and dynamics of consciousness.
36/47
4.4 Limitations
The model proposed here is only a starting point and a very primitive version of what we could
expect from a mathematical and computational model of consciousness ultimately, in terms of
complexity and formal rigor. However, we see the principles introduced herein as a basis for
constraining more comprehensive models of consciousness and for exploring the relationships of
consciousness to other scientic theories. Examples of the diverse applications and mathematical
structures it implicates vary from topology to group theory, dynamical systems theory and beyond,
but also for making connections with clinical and even pedagogical questions.
An essential question that remains open is that of the type of "eld" and support the projective
space is operating on in consciousness: the very fabric, so to speak, of the conscious space (e.g., a
eld of numbers?). If projective transformations operate in conscious access and provide us with
the rules for the rendering of key spatial aspects of subjective experience in consciousness, the
ontology or material support of the interface or medium for this rendering remains mysterious. We
suggested that the whole workspace was somehow "virtual", a sort of "user interface", but this
does not fully address the question. Images can be rendered and projected on a screen, but what
constitutes the 3-dimensional "screen" of consciousness will remain unsettled here. From this
standpoint, it is however important to mention the fundamental result established by Hilbert and
Artin [87] according to which geometrical axioms of incidence that do not use any kind of numbers
in their formulation (like Desargues' and Pappus' axioms) are sucient to generate by themselves
a commutative eld of numbers. Numbers appear in an elegant manner through automorphisms of
special automorphisms. Therefore, the construction of projective spaces from linear algebra does
not lack generality. Moreover, projective geometry can contribute to the emergence of implicit
computations, including comparison of ratios of length, like harmonic proportions [110].
It is certain that the structure of the conscious workspace is more complex than what this
model captures. There is evidence and a rationale for suggesting that visual awareness, for instance,
embeds a hierarchy of structuring spaces, including, at the top of the hierarchy, abstracted spaces
representing the Euclidean properties of the world [48]. However, projective geometry is a quite
general geometry. When associated with a continuous eld with metrical properties, it actually
embeds ane and Euclidean geometry, and orthographic projections respecting Euclidean
properties can be generated from projective geometry by assuming a vantage point near innity.
The relationships between the PCM and the dynamical and intensive qualities of consciousness
need more elaboration. There are dynamical components in our model, since it is based on active
inference, as driven by free energy, which denes the principle and driving force for intentionality
and action, and implements a eld of motivation based on the spatial mapping of personal
relevance. The model features a complex interplay between cycles of perception, imagination,
motor programming, and action, through projective transformations and complex mechanisms of
inference related to personal relevance. These we expect must fundamentally constrain the pace of
time-consciousness, as a moment-to-moment construction of unied experiences involving
"protention and retention" [2]. But the exact dynamics that link the inference engine and the
projective geometry engine remains largely undened and underdetermined: it will depend on the
level of sophistication and specications of future implementations of the basic kernel of the model
and probably on the species of consciousness targeted. The status of intensive dimensions, e.g.,
connected to arousal, vigilance and emotions [9], as well as their dierentiation into a range of
qualitatively dierent emotional states, need to be worked out, starting from their connection to
free energy [92,93]. Phenomenologically, we proposed that several aspects of bodily feelings are
expressed as spatial transformations of the representation of the body in the workspace. To some
extent, intensive dimensions, e.g., as with the feeling of more intense cardiac sensations when the
heart rate increases [146], can be construed as spatial representations, e.g., as the heartbeat
increasingly occupies our attention and interferes with our ability to carry on other mental tasks.
In other words, we expect that some intensive dimensions of subjective experience will reduce to
spatial quantities that are consciously accessed as such, e.g., the amplitude of a change in posture
as a function of the intensity of an emotion, in connection to a eld of personal relevance.
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Nothing has been said here about many other key dimensions of experience: the gamut of
sensory qualities, from colors to tones and smells. Even though again, one might argue that
essential aspects of the phenomenology of vision, smell and sound have a spatial manifestation,
some key phenomenal features, like color, tone, and smell qualia, remain outside of the explanatory
reach of the model as it is; even though they all certainly often carry personal relevance as sensory
qualities.
Another missing link in our theory is the status and role of language in the workspace, how it
interacts with the mechanism of conscious access and how symbolic representations (e.g., words)
and projective imagination or mental imagery mutually inuence each other. This is an important
question, but it is beyond the scope of this contribution. It will be the topic of a future
communication, as we have specic hypotheses about this issue [1]. We note that active inference
as a generalization of Bayesian inference can be set up to operate based on propositional models
and logical reasoning.
Finally, the PCM does not tell us how subjectivity, sensory qualities, and representations with a
phenomenal character relate, in their very phenomenal properties, to the computational and
biophysical properties of the brain. Even though the model features a key relationship between
computational ecacy and the mode of phenomenal access to spatial information in consciousness,
and can be used to derive neurocomputational hypotheses, it neither solves the Hard Problem [32]
nor closes the Explanatory Gap [147] completely. On the other hand, it could well be that the
construction of mathematical models that allow one to intelligibly link the phenomenology of
conscious experience to experimentally conrmed neurocomputational implementations of the
models are all that one could or should reasonably expect in this regard. In the absence of
compelling arguments for dualism or panpsychism, the neurophenomenological method suggested
here can be taken as a key to the development of a physicalist theory of consciousness
[see [4,7,8,35,51,130,148]. And even in the presence of such arguments, since only few would deny
that every dierence in consciousness corresponds to a dierence in brain processing, the method
and the resulting models retain their full signicance.
4.5 Future directions for the model
Future versions of the kernel of our reduced-model will integrate a more dierentiated and
sophisticated repertory of distributions of personal relevance as related to shapes/morphologies,
sets of basic actions, physical and social models. They will also integrate a full 3-dimensional
projective geometry engine coupled to a virtual world containing meshes of environments, which
will dene a support for elds of conditional probabilities related to personal relevance. They will
feature active inference of new structures in space to enrich the world-model through multiview
reconstruction processing. The world-map itself can be dynamic and easily updated to create
events that force the agent to a change in perspective. Complex structures can be modeled with
attached personal relevance maps. The kernel will approach and avoid these structures accordingly:
e.g., avoiding walls, approaching doors (an implicit collision avoidance mechanics is embedded in
the kernel; it is all a matter of setting up probabilities).
Already with the reduced-model, the instantiated agents can be rendered more or less
intelligent and resilient, depending on the tuning of several parameters such as the rate and
duration of pure imagination-mode, the prior updating rate, and the initial conditions in the
situation of the agents, in terms of both factual and believed given information, along with the
agents' developmental history. But the capacity of their consciousness will be enhanced and
enriched by explicitly adding in the model a layer of appraisal of self-relevance and self-concern
based on a mechanism of perspective taking associated with the putative standpoint of other
agents, i.e., a model of intersubjectivity based on the Theory of Mind. This will require to embed
and instantiate virtual simulations of other agents' consciousnesses in the algorithm of the agent
itself, based on the same principle used for the basic model.
We can envision using collectivities of such agents in interaction (they would be quite tractable
computationally), which would have prior biases towards each other, e.g., some leading to mutual
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attraction, others to mutual repulsion, and others to stalking behaviors. Agent 'liking' each other,
could easily share their knowledge (prior maps) based on 'trust', and mutually update their prior
maps through simple message-passing algorithms. In cases of disappointment, i.e., a mismatch
between the information provided and actual sensory evidence, the probabilities of personal
relevance attached to the agent source of information would naturally be negatively tuned down.
Interesting social behaviors should emerge.
4.6 Conclusion and perspectives
The present Projective Consciousness Model contributes to the overarching goal of mathematizing
phenomenology [35,148]. One important incentive for deriving generative models of consciousness
is the possibility of using such models as mathematical tools for the development of a
phenomenological psychology, based on sound formal and computational foundations. If our model
contains some truth, a future formal psychological science may include the study (and the
classication) of possible conscious states, based on projective solutions from projective geometry
in the context of processes of active inference driven by the minimization of free energy.
Computational implementation of the PCM can be used to predict human behavior as a function
of parameters across ranges of appraisal proles, in normal and pathological contexts, with broad
clinical perspectives. Another connected incentive for deriving generative models is to make
connections with other elds of science that build generative models (physics, chemistry, biology,
computer science), and to make connections with applications, including clinical models and
applications. We believe that our model oers a promising toolkit and potential formal
foundations for psychology, neuroscience and articial intelligence.
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